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Within seconds of sitting down at the computer terminal in 
his father's study, ten-year-old Simon is connected to the In-
ternet. A vast world of learning opens up before him-never 
before in history has such a powerful network of information 
been available to so many for so little. But Simon isn't inter-
ested in worlds of information: he's on a mission. He plays a 
few games on his favorite gaming web site, checks up on 
friends in their virtual hangout, and updates some entries on 
his own web page-but not before finishing his research for a 
report on Abraham Lincoln due next week. Finally, when it's 
time for bed, Simon reluctantly ends his travels for the day, 
logging off with a click. His mother, Susan, watches Simon 
climb the stairs to get ready for bed, thinking about how the 
new software she had installed on the family computer two 
months ago has changed little Simon's life. No longer were Su-
san and her husband forced to be constantly at Simon's side 
while he surfed the net-he was now free to explore on his own, 
safe and secure. As she started up the stairs to tuck Simon 
into his bed, Susan wondered at how the Internet, once a place 
of danger and confusion, had been tamed: "Amazing . . . to 
think that filters changed everything." 
Those of us who are advocates of the Internet had better 
face up to it: the Internet has an image problem. Time maga-
zine devotes a special issue to "cyberporn."l The President de-
scribes "horror stories about the inappropriate material for 
children that can be found on the Internet," and the fact that 
"children can be victimized over the Internet."2 Over 1,150 sto-
ries in major newspapers this year alone contain the words 
1. See, e.g., Philip Elmer-Dewitt, On a Screen Near You: It's Popular, 
Pervasive and Surprisingly Perverse, According to the First Survey of Online 
Erotica, TIME, July 3, 1995, at 38. 
2. President's Remarks Announcing Steps to Make the Internet Family-
Friendly, 33 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1077 (July 16, 1997) [hereinafter 
President's Remarks]. 
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"Internet" and "porn."3 In some ways, the Supreme Court's de-
cisive holding in Reno u. ACLU that there was "no basis for 
qualifYing the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should 
be applied to this medium"4 only intensified the problem, 
bringing new attention to the difficulties of regulating-or even 
monitoring-this diverse new medium. 
Therefore, it should come as no surprise that the response 
to Reno u. ACLU and the burgeoning content of the Internet 
has been largely in the direction of technological solutions: es-
pecially towards filtering and blocking software. These sys-
tems hold out the promise of easy, effective, and flexible con-
tent selection-Simon's story represents the ideal of filters' 
supporters-without government intervention. PICS: Internet 
Access Controls Without Censorship is the title that developers 
of one growing filtering system gave their manifesto.s 
As with any "solution" to a difficult problem, however, fil-
tering technologies are not uncontroversial. They have been 
variously described as "the devil"6 and "the most effective 
global censorship technology ever designed."7 They have been 
roundly criticized as being ineffective, both overbroad and un-
derinclusive. And probably unconstitutional to boot.s 
It is into this thicket that this article proposes to go. Fil-
tering technologies-friend or foe-are here to stay; we had 
better learn how to deal with them. But rather than focus on 
the legal/policy choices inherent in the selection of any regula-
tory system-legal or extra-legal-! attempt here to sketch a 
way of looking at the issues raised by filtering technologies 
more directly. Instead of extrapolating the technological and 
economic development of filters and looking back skeptically, I 
seek to understand how the filters of today and the foreseeable 
future fit into the First Amendment of today and the foresee-
able future. There are two requirements for this. The first is a 
3. Search ofLEXIS, News library, Majpap File (May 10, 1998). 
4. 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2344 (1997). 
5. Paul Resnik & James Miller, PICS: Internet Access Controls Without 
Censorship, 10 COMM. ACM, Oct. 1996, at 87. 
6. See Lawrence Lessig, Tyranny in the Infrastructure, WIRED 5.07, July 
1997, at 96, 96. 
7. Simson Garfinkel, Good Clean PICS: The Most Effective Censorship 
Technology the Net Has Ever Seen May Already Be Installed on Your Desktop, 
HOTWIRED (Feb. 5, 1997) <http://www.hotwired.com/packet/garflnkel/97/05/ 
index2a.html>. 
8. See generally Lawrence Lessig, What Things Regulate Speech: CDA 
2.0 us. Filtering, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 629 (1998). 
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realistic, reasonably detailed , and precise understanding of the 
technology. Just as one would not expect to discuss the Consti-
tution without knowing some intricacies of its operations, any 
discussion of filters and the First Amendment must be 
grounded firmly in technological understanding. The second 
prerequisite is a vigorous attempt to apply cur rent First 
.i\mendment doctrine to the issues, noting where changes in 
the technology or the law will reach different results, but never 
straying too far from present understanding. 
I approach this task from an operational perspect ive, at-
tempting to measure the limits on government uses of filters 
imposed by the First Amendment. My conclusion-that the 
present technology and the current state of the doctrine allow 
the government considerable latitude in this area-will not be 
heartening to those who seek to send filters the way of the 
Communications Decency Act (CDA). But neither should it be 
comforting to those who would seek increased government in-
volvement in Internet regulation: a recurrent theme in my 
analysis is the significance of private filtering choices unen-
cumbered by government regulation. In the end, the impor-
tance of the ever-changing relationship between the technol-
ogy, the law, the market, and the participants is the dominant 
factor; evolution of any one factor will likely yield different re-
sults into the future. A solid frame of reference, however, will 
become ever more important. 
Part I of this article details the essential features of to-
day's Internet filters. In particular, I make a distinction be-
tween a database system of filters, reliant on a central compi-
lation of ratings and content identifiers, and an embedded 
system, which focuses on the self-rating task of potential 
speaker-producers. The embedded systems, primarily the Plat-
form for Internet Content Selection (PICS), offer the hope of a 
rating system that is neither under- nor over-inclusive and 
that is inexpensive, easy to administer, and potentially self-
enforcing via users' choices to opt-out of viewing unrated pages. 
Part II then looks at the potential for filters as regulation gen-
erally, noting in particular the economic and coordination 
problems that are likely to prevent the spontaneous wide-
spread adoption of a PICS rating system without governmental 
assistance. 
The essay then turns its attention to approaches the gov-
ernment might take when seeking to support filter-based con-
tent regulation. Part III explores direct government filtering. 
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This approach is likely to be found to be an unconstitutional 
content-based restriction on speech, in large measure because, 
under present filtering technology, the "fit" between the ends 
and the means would be very poor since the current state of the 
technology in fi lters is simply not precise enough. Having de-
termined that direct filtering is unlikely to be successful, Part 
IV discusses indirect government approaches. First, the gov-
ernment could require labeling of Internet content but not im-
pose any filters, which would simply enable end users to make 
the content selection choices. Under the current doctrine, this 
is likely to be a constitutional approach: attacks on it under a 
compelled speech, interference with architecture, or compelled 
association theory all fall short of invalidating a cleverly-drawn 
government statute. A second indirect approach is government 
use of a variety of techniques to influence the market in a way 
that might support the creation and support of a PICS rating 
system. Although some of these activities might raise uncon-
stitutional conditions issues, they are likely to be upheld by the 
Supreme Court. Part IV ends with a brief look at the role of 
the state action and unconstitutional conditions doctrine, using 
the possible analogy to the V-Chip from the broadcast context 
as an example. 
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO FILTERING & BLOCKING 
TECHNOLOGY 
It is often pointed out, particularly in the context of the In-
ternet, that technology can be a far more pervasive and effec-
tive constraint on behavior than the law.9 Properly installed 
and configured, technological "code" offers a scheme of con-
straints on Internet content that are untiring, perfectly consis-
tent, and allows a degree of precision and customization that 
statutory approaches and even licensing schemes cannot hope 
to match.lO Thus the panacea of a technological solution to the 
problem of content regulation in cyberspace has become in-
creasingly attractive.11 But it is important to first recognize 
9. Lawrence Lessig, in particular, has persuasively made this point. See 
id. 
10. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2353-54 (1997) (O'Connor, J., 
dissenting). 
11. See, e.g., The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Internet On-
line Summit: Focus on Children, Mission Statement (last modified Nov. 19, 
1997) <http://www.kidsonline.org/missionl> (encouraging technological "user 
empowerment tools" to shield children from inappropriate material). 
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that the true problem that content -filtering seeks to solve is in-
formational , not technological. 
A. THE MODES OF FILTERING 
Whatever you call it-content selection, content regula-
tion, editing, or censorship-the tricky part is the information. 
The objective is to prevent certain materials or content from 
arriving in places where they are not wanted. Mom or Dad 
wants to keep smut out of the kids' computer. The boss wants 
to keep an orderly working environment. And perhaps the 
government censor wants to keep antigovernment ideas from 
taking root. Although one may disagree with the particular 
applications, the constituent parts of any solution to these 
problems are the same: control over the means of distribution, 
and information about the content itself. With perfect control 
over the distribution and perfect information, the solution is 
achieved. 
This solution set is not unique to Internet content. Pre-
announced guides (information) and channel-changers (control) 
are used to "regulate" what appears on our televisions. Given 
prior knowledge of what junk mail would arrive in this after-
noon's mail, one could confidently "filter" out the unwanted 
material-or have someone else do it.'2 
Among the moving parts here-information and control-
it seems clear that society has a considerably stronger grip on 
the means of controlling distribution than on the information 
required to effectively filter. Television guides are not perfect, 
and today's mail is hard to predict. Therefore, a set of second-
best techniques have developed: channel surfing (lingering on a 
channel only long enough to ascertain its content) and 
"envelope guessing" (discarding mail based on a quick glance at 
the envelope) are each attempts to resolve the information 
problem. 
Information is what the new technology of filters really 
provides. Conceptually, the filtering of content in cyberspace 
first assumes that the content is rated according to some 
known set of criteria-providing information about the content. 
Second, it presumes that someone-often the end user-has set 
options (i.e., control) specifying the type of content that is al-
12. See, e.g., Rowan v. United States Post Office, 397 U.S. 728, 740 (1970) 
(allowing the Post Office to implement mail patron requests to block mail 
based on sender address). 
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lowable, and that which is not. The operating mechanism of 
the filtering system compares the rating applied to the content 
with the options applicable to the user . Where the rating ex-
ceeds in some way the choices-perhaps by being too "adult" in 
nature-the content is "blocked," usually by not being dis-
played on the user's screen or downloaded to the user's com-
puter. 
Obviously, the crit ical points in this framework for our 
purposes are the rat ings and the setting of options: this is 
where the technology accepts human inputs. The comparison 
between the rating and the options is merely an 
"administrative" function performed by technology; the speed 
and accuracy of the system make the widespread filtering fe a-
sible, but it is entirely controlled by the rating and option in-
puts. 
Broadly speaking, there are two forms of ratings systems. 
The first are database systems, which associate ratings with 
particular content and store the rating-content information.t3 
When a user requests a particular piece of content, her system 
will contact the database, which will send back the corre-
sponding rating. In contrast, an embedded ratings system uses 
labels or tags within the content itself to transmit the corre-
sponding rating.14 The primary difference between the two 
systems is who affixes the rating to a particular piece of con-
tent. In an embedded system, ratings are typically assigned 
and entered by the content's creator, while in a database sys-
tem the ratings for a vast array of content are created and 
stored by a third party-that is, neither the end user nor crea-
tor.1s The burgeoning commercial market for ratings products 
13. Cyber Patrol, SurfWatch, CyberSitter, and X-Stop are all examples of 
database-driven filtering software products. See, e.g. , Cyber Patrol (visited 
Oct. 16, 1998) <http://www.cyberpatrol.com>; Surfwatch (visited Oct. 16, 
1998) <http://www.surfwatch.com>. 
14. The Platform for Internet Content Selection (PICS) is the best-known 
example of an embedded system. See, e.g., Paul Resnik, Filtering Information 
on the Internet, SCI. AM., Mar. 1997, at 62. 
15. This is primarily because the huge volume of content to be rated and 
the difficulty of keeping the database system current virtually mandates 
spreading the costs. See Study: Search Engines Fall Short , CNET 
NEWS.COM (Apr. 2, 1998) <http://news.com/News!Item/0,4,20728,00.html> 
(finding that even search engines index only a fraction of the web). Not all 
database systems are run by third parties, however. The University of Michi-
gan is demonstrating a database ratings system that will use ratings assigned 
by the "community" using the ratings system. See PICS Application Incuba-
tor (visited Oct. 16, 1998) <http://krabappel.si.umich.edu/incubator/> ("Such a 
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has fueled the growth of these third-party systems, most of 
which sell access to a database, and even subscriptions to up-
dates.16 
Problems with these database systems are well docu-
mented.!? First, they are wildly overbroad and inaccur ate, of-
ten blocking unexpected and useful content. 18 Second, they 
face an almost impossible task of keeping up with the tremen-
dous volume and growth of the content on the Internet.19 And 
system uses embedded labels in combination with externally created rat-
ings."). 
16. For example, The Learning Company offers Cyber Patrol4.0, a paren-
tal control software product, for $29.95. See Cyber Patrol Fact Sheet (visited 
Oct. 16, 1998) <http://www.cyberpatrol.com/fact.htm>. Cyber Patrol uses a 
CyberNOT and CyberYES list to allow users the option of blocking the content 
on the CyberNOT list or limiting content to that on the CyberYES list. See id. 
The lists are updated regularly by a "team of professionals ... including par-
ents and teachers." Id. Subscriptions to the updating service are an extra 
charge. See id. 
Of course, the ratings need not be assigned by humans. NetNanny is 
software that scans the content of materials before it is displayed on a user's 
screen. If the content matches words or phrases defmed by the user to be dis-
allowed, then the content will not be displayed. See Netnanny FAQ (visited 
Dec. 10, 1998) <http://www.netnanny.com/support/faq.htm>. 
17. Declan B. McCullagh & Brock N. Meeks, Keys to the Kingdom, 
CYBERWIRE DISPATCH (July 3, 1996) <http://www.cyberwerks.com/cyberwire/ 
cwd/cwd.96.07.03.html>; Peacefrre: Youth i\lliance Against Censorship, Why 
Peacefire Opposes Blocking Software (visited Oct. 25, 1998) <http://www. 
peacefire.org> [hereinafter Peacefrre); Electronic Privacy Information Center, 
Faulty Filters: How Content Filters Block Access to Kid-Friendly Information 
on the Internet (visited Jan. 5, 1999) <http://www2.epic.org/reports/filter-
report.html>. 
18. For example, recent reports by the Censorware Project and Peace-
fire.org note that the highest-rated filtering software product, Cyber Patrol, 
blocks the web sites of Planned Parenthood, Envirolink (an environmental 
clearinghouse), the AIDS Authority, the MIT Project on Mathematics and 
Computation, the University of Arizona, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engi-
neers Construction Engineering Research Laboratories. See Peacefire, supra 
note 17; The Censorware Project, Blacklisted by Cyber Patrol: From Ada to 
Yoyo (visited Dec. 23, 1997) <http://www.spectacle.org/cwp/ada-yoyo.html>; 
see generally Jonathan Weinberg, Rating the Net , 19 HAsTINGS COMM. & ENT. 
L.J. 453 (1997). 
19. A recent study of search engines concluded that (as of early 1998) 
there are more than 320 million individual pages on the web alone. Study: 
Search Engines Fall Short, supra note 15. By some accounts, the number of 
pages on the web has been doubling every three to six months since 1993. See 
Matthew Gray, Web Growth Summary (visited Oct. 16, 1998) <http://www. 
mit.edu/people/mkgray/net/web-growth-summary.html>. 
The database filtering systems could respond to this volume by assigning 
rat ings more generically-by rating an entire domain or host rather than in-
dividual web pages, for example. Of course, this only exacerbates the inaccu-
r acy of the r atings. For example, Cyber Patrol has listed all pages at 
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third, it is very difficult for the user to k...now what is being 
blocked and why, because the creators of these systems con-
sider the databases to be proprietary information, and their 
contents are subject to the judgment of the people involved.2o 
Database filtering systems are a coarse tool, and, while they 
remain the most feasible technology available today, the more 
refined embedded systems hold the promise of solving some of 
the most persistent problems with rating systems. 
B. EMBEDDED SYSTEMS: THE PLI\TFORM FOR INTERNET 
CONTENT SELECTION (PICS) 
Conceptually, an embedded ratings system seeks to solve 
the major problems of the database systems by shifting the re-
sponsibility of rating content to the producer and transmitting 
the rating with the content itself. Thus, an embedded system 
wholly avoids the volume problem fundamental to the data-
base systems. Further, by "labeling" or "tagging" each page or 
"members.tripod.com" under the categories of "violence," "nudity," "sexual 
acts," and "satanic/cult information." See The Censorware Project, supra note 
18. That host is home to 1.4 million web pages, and while some of them 
probably do have offensive material, most probably do not, and are blocked by 
the program. See id. 
20. Many of the filtering software programs denote specific criteria by 
which they rate pages. For example, Cyber Patrol has a list of twelve catego-
ries of rated material: violence/profanity, partial nudity, full nudity, sexual 
acts, gross depictions, intolerance, satanic/cult, drugs/drug culture, mili-
tant/extremist, sex education, questionable behavior or gambling, and alcohol 
and tobacco. See Cyber Patrol, CyberNOT List Criteria (visited Oct. 16, 1998) 
<http://www.cyberpatrol.com/cp_list.htm>. Users of the software can choose 
to block any or all of these rated categories. 
The story of Solid Oak Software's CyberSitter is an enlightening example 
of the ways that these databases can be abused. After Brock Meeks and De-
clan McCullagh wrote Keys to the Kingdom, a Cyberwire Dispatch story ex-
posing the overbreadth of filtering software (including the fact that CyberSit-
ter blocked the National Organization for Women for "sexual content"), 
CyberSitter blocked the Cyberwire Dispatch site. The software still blocks the 
site for Peacefire, a young persons' organization against online censorship 
that contains material critical of filtering software, including CyberSitter. See 
McCullagh & Meeks, supra note 17; Peacefrre, supra note 17. Solid Oak Soft-
ware has threatened to block all 2500 web sites hosted by Peacefrre's provider 
unless the provider removed the Peacefire site. Rebecca Vessel, CyberSitter 
Goes After Teen, WIRED NEWS (Dec. 9, 1996) <http://www.wired.com. 
news/story/901.html>. In 1997, it was revealed that CyberSitter's installation 
software scanned the user's hard drive to determine whether the user had 
visited the Peacefrre web site, and would not install the software if it had. See 
Brian McWilliams, CYBERsitter Filters Out Privacy, Says Anticensorship 
Group, PC WORLD NEWSRADIO (July 2, 1997) <http://www.pcworld.com/ 
pcwtoday/article/0, 1510,5006,00.html>. 
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other element of content, the embedded system is neither un-
der- nor overbroad.21 And because producers rate their own 
content as they create it, the rating system is comprehensive, 
and the third-party effects noted above are not present. 
The Platform for Internet Content Selection (PICS) is a 
standard for embedding rating labels within Internet content 
developed by Paul Resnik of AT&T Research and James Miller 
of MIT.22 PICS itself specifies little more than the syntax and 
protocols used to label content and transmit the labels; it does 
not itself specifY a ratings system.23 The creators of PICS in-
tend to enable other groups (or even individuals) to develop 
their own rating schemes, using PICS as the underlying stan-
dard to ensure interoperability.24 Thus, for example, any web 
browser that is PICS-enabled would be able to use any of the 
PICS-compatible ratings systems. A market might then de-
velop for such ratings systems, allowing a diversity of ratings 
systems as well as placing the choices regarding rating and 
viewing content in the hands of the producers and users, re-
spectively. As Resnik and Miller note: 
Around the world, governments are considering r estrictions on 
on-line content. Since children differ, contexts of use differ, and val-
ues differ, blanket restrictions on distribution can never meet every-
one's needs. Selection software can meet diverse needs , by blocking 
reception, and labels are the raw materials for implementing context-
specific selection criteria. The availability of large quantities of la-
bels will also lead to new sorting, searching, filtering, and organizing 
tools that help users surf the Internet more efficiently. 25 
In many ways, the promises of PICS have been borne out. 
A market of sorts has developed for the PICS-compatible rat-
ings system; most of the major Internet-related companies 
have announced support for PICS. Politicians and pundits 
alike have endorsed the PICS approach to content regulation.26 
But PICS is not without its problems, both systemic and per-
ceptual. 
21. Unless, of course, the producer inaccurately classifies the content. 
22. See Resnik & Miller, supra note 5. 
23. See id. at 87. 
24. See id. at 88. 
25. Id. at 93. 
26. See, e.g., A Family Friendly Internet (visited Oct. 16, 1998) 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/WHJNew!Ratings/> ("On Wednesday, July 16, 
President Clinton and Vice President Gore announced a strategy for making 
the Internet 'family friendly."'). 
1999] FILTERS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 765 
First, the enabling technology of PICS allows a whole new 
dimension to social interaction: labeling that is standardized 
and perfectly predictive, allowing labels to be ubiquitous . La-
bels have power, and PICS makes this power accessible. Not 
only can one be the town crier, one can be the town censor as 
well. Indeed, there is nothing that limits the scope of ratings 
based on PICS, or who can implement them. While we often 
think of ratings in terms of "adult" content, the PICS system 
could just as effectively label content for subjective attributes 
like "quality" or even label based on politics-such as 
"republican" or "democrat," or "mainstream" or "radical." This 
author even created a PICS rating system that allows rating 
and selection based on the "stupidity" quotient of a particular 
web page.27 A corporation, a government, or an individual 
could create a ratings system that labeled content that was 
critical or embarrassing. Don't like op-eds written by Rush 
Limbaugh? Add a tag to your PICS system and block him out 
from your screen (and from others who agree with you). Really 
enjoy classical music? Then search for content with the classi-
cal music label and save yourself some time. The possibilities 
are limited only by social creativity. At least in theory. 
C. COORDINATION AND COOPERATION UNDER PICS 
Here's the catch: PICS requires the cooperation of the pro-
ducer of the content. If the population of web page producers 
fail to see the wisdom in rating according to a particular sys-
tem, or if they don't know about it, they will not embed the sys-
tem's label, and the rating system will not cover their pages. 
Similarly, if a producer misrates content, the rating system 
will not be able to correct for it; you will get Rush Limbaugh 
when you expected him to be blocked. 
Some implementations of PICS take a step at addressing 
this problem by allowing the user to choose the default re-
sponse to an unrated page. For example, version 4.0 of Micro-
soft's Internet Explorer allows the user to check a box to choose 
whether unrated pages can be seen.28 The implied threat of 
opt-out by users will, in theory at least, encourage many com-
mercial web sites to rate their pages according to the most 
27. Through a very scientific observation process, I assure you. 
28. See Recreational Software Advisory Council on the Internet (visited 
Oct. 16, 1998) <http://www.rsac.org/fra_content.asp?onindex=21> (instructing 
parents how to activate the filter). The factory default setting is to allow un-
rated sites to be seen. 
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popular rating services.29 One can imagine that ifPICS gains a 
powerful following among the public, the pressure on producers 
to label content will only increase.3o 
For now, however, PICS faces a complex collective action 
problem. The incentives to label content only gain meaning as 
more people utilize PICS in the opt-out sort of way. But until 
more content is labeled, most users will be loath to opt-out of 
unrated content for fear of missing something important.31 Al-
though the "costs" to a producer of rating content according to 
any particular ratings service are quite low-typically con-
sisting of placing a single line in the HTML code of the page-
many producers may have political or other reasons to avoid 
labeling. 
Another important aspect of the PICS labeling system is 
that just as it is neutral regarding the substance of the ratings 
applied, the technology is neutral towards the location where 
the filtering is achieved. Resnik and Miller conceive the fil-
tering to take place on the end user's computer, allowing a high 
degree of individual choice and customization.32 But there is 
no particular reason that the filtering could not take place at 
some other level, such as at the user's Internet Service Pro-
vider (ISP), or the regional network access point (NAP). In 
fact, any nodes between the user and the content server are po-
tential filter-points, and the user may not even know about it. 
Corporations or universities could filter their connection to the 
wider Internet,33 keeping internal users from accessing materi-
als deemed inappropriate. ISPs could offer "upstream" PICS 
filtering as a benefit to families; no need for parents to learn, 
install, and configure any software. And, of course, govern-
29. Microsoft rates their pages according to the Recreational Software 
Advisory Council (RSACi) system. See msn.com (visited Dec. 10, 1998) <http: 
//home.rnicrosoft.coml>. 
30. I suspect that this pressure will not be limited to commercial produc-
ers, but will extend to anyone who wishes to achieve the largest possible audi-
ence size. In order to "raise your voice" in cyberspace, it may become neces-
sary to label it. 
31. For example, Yahoo.com, the second most popular site on the net, is 
presently unrated, as are Netscape.com, the third most popular site, the New 
York Times, and others. See Media Metrix, Top New Media Results (visited 
March 1998) <http://www.npd.com/interact_mmnewmedia398.htm> (ranking 
the popularity of web sites among users connecting from their homes). 
32. See Resnik & Miller, supra note 5, at 91. 
33. Stanford University, for example, routes most Internet traffic through 
a computer named "sunet-gateway.stanford.edu," an obvious place for a filter. 
Most corporations have similar set-ups. 
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ments could filter content entering their territory to the extent 
they controlled the points of entry.34 Placing labels on content, 
although theoretically to facilitate individual selection of rat-
ings, or what Justice O'Connor called "user-based zoning,"35 
would be an incredibly effective tool for censorship.36 
D. PICS-ENABLED RATINGS SYSTEMS: LABELING IN ACTION 
The PICS-enabled ratings systems themselves bear some 
consideration as well. One argument made in support of PICS 
is that it will facilitate the growth of a marketplace of ratings 
systems. Of course, it is vaguely unsettling to speak of content 
blocking in this way; after all, this is Brandeis turned on his 
head: a marketplace for anti-ideas, if you willY Nonetheless , it 
is a powerful argument: the interoperability and ease-of-use of 
the PICS-enabled systems will greatly reduce consumer "lock-
in," making the market for such systems more robust, and cre-
ating-in theory at least-a diversity of approaches to the rat-
ing and labeling issue. 
In practice, it is difficult to determine whether the market 
for anti-ideas is functioning smoothly. As of early summer 
1998, it appears that there are six self-rating systems devel-
oped and several other third-party rating systems based on 
PICS.38 By far the largest of these is sponsored by the Recrea-
tional Software Advisory Council on the Internet (RSACi).39 In 
34. See Lessig, supra note 6, at 96. Control over access points is not a 
trivial matter. New interconnections are springing up all the time; demo-
cratic governments at least would be hard pressed to keep up with this 
growth. 
35. Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2354 (1997) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
36. See Garfinkel, supra note 7 ("Resnick and Miller have done a great job 
designing a framework for censorship. I don't think I could have done it bet-
ter myself."). 
37. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., con-
curring) ("If there be time ... to avert the evil [flowing from speech] by the 
process of education, the remedy to be applied is more free speech, not en-
forced silence."), overruled in part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 
(1969) (per curiam). 
38. See Paul Resnick, Platform for Internet Content Selection (PIGS) (last 
modified Jan. 3, 1998) <http://www.w3.org/PICS/>. PICS allows the embed-
ded code to refer to another Internet site for the label rather than containing 
the label itself. See id. This essentially turns the PICS system into a data-
base system, as the external labels are typically assigned by a third party. 
SurfWatch, Cyber Patrol, and NetSheperd are all examples of PICS-enabled 
third-party rating systems. See id. 
39. See About RSACi (visited Oct. 18, 1998) <http://www.rsac.org/fra_ 
Content.asp?onindex=1>. 
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December 1997, RSACi claimed to have 50,000 pages of content 
rated according to its system40 and comes pre-installed in all 
versions of Microsoft's Internet Explorer.41 
Rating one's web site (or web page) according to the RSACi 
system is free, and requires two basic steps: (1) answering a se-
ries of questions about the site, including contact information 
and content description, at the RSACi home page; and (2) ob-
taining the snippet of rating code and pasting it into the HTML 
code of the web page at issue.42 Significantly, RSACi, by re-
quiring the prospective rater to electronically affirm an agree-
ment, retains "the right to audit and inspect the Rated Web 
Site to confirm that Applicant's use of the Assigned Rating 
meets the established standards" of use and specifically notes 
the possibility of "corrective labeling."43 
The RSACi rating comprises an assignment of "levels" 
within four categories: nudity, sex, language, and violence.44 
Each category allows five levels (numbered zero to four), and 
each level has a defined meaning.45 For example, in the lan-
guage category, level four is defined as "[c]rude, vulgar lan-
guage or extreme hate speech," level three as "strong language 
or hate speech," level two as "[m]oderate expletives or profan-
ity," level one as "[m]ild expletives," and level zero as "[n]one of 
the above."46 After the user completes the questionnaire-and 
40. See Recreational Software Advisory Council Rates Over 50,000 Web 
Sites Free: Voluntary System Leads the Industry in Safeguarding the Internet 
for Children (visited Dec. 1, 1997) <http://www.rsac.org/fra_Content.asp?onin-
dex=73>. 
41. See Recreational Software Advisory Council on the Internet, supra 
note 28. 
42. See Parents-How to Use RSACi (visited Oct. 18, 1998) <http://www. 
rsac.org/fra_content.asp>. 
43. See RSACi Terms & Conditions (visited Oct. 18, 1998) <http://www. 
rsac.org/content/register/terms.html>. This at least raises the possibility that 
RSACi will supplant a producer's judgment for its own, although I am un-
aware of any such circumstances where this has arisen. 
44. See About RSACi, supra note 39. 
45. See id. 
46. Id. The terms used to describe the categories are further defmed. 
Thus, "mild expletives" are further described as: "The words hell and damn, 
ass and horse's ass, BUT NOT asshole, assface, asswipe; butthead and 
buttface BUT NOT butthole and buttwipe." Definitions for RSACi Language 
Questions (visited Oct. 18, 1998) <http://www.rsac.org/content/register/de£' 
language.html>. The system's defmition of "innocent kissing" (suitable for a 
zero rating on the sex scale) is: 
Any portrayal of humans or human-like creatures which a reasonable 
person would consider as just kissing on lips (without touching of 
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affirms the contract-she is presented with a line of computer 
code which can be pasted into the web page. For example, the 
RSACi code for my web page is: 
<META http-equiv="PICS-Label" content='(PICS-1.1 "http://www .rs-
ac.org/ratingsvOl.html" l gen true comment "RSACi North America 
Server" on "1998.04.29T11:55-0800" r (n 0 s 0 v 0 l 0))'> 
The "rating label" is designated by the numbers corre-
sponding with the category letters. Therefore, in the example 
above, the nudity level is zero, the sex level is zero, the violence 
level is zero, and the language level is zero. In contrast, the 
Playboy homepage's PICS label is: 
<META http-equiv ="PICS-Label" content= ' (PICS-1.0 "http://www. 
rsac.org/ratingsvOl.html" l gen true comment "RSACi North America 
Server" by "rodgerb@playboy.com" for "http://www.playboy.com" on 
"1996.04.04T08:15-0500" r (n 4 s 3 v 0 14))'>47 
Thus, Playboy has self-rated its site as having "[f]rontal nu-
dity," "[n]on-explicit sexual acts," no violence, and "[c]rude, 
vulgar language or extreme hate speech."48 Browsers with op-
tions set at lower levels in any one of the four categories would 
not load the Playboy web site but would be able to see my site. 
II. FILTERS AS REGULATION: COORDINATION AND THE 
NETWORK 
The conceptual attractiveness of Internet content filters 
and their limitations prompts discussion regarding the scope of 
governmental involvement in their use. In their idealized 
form, technological filters hold out the promise of a dynamic, 
efficient, and effective means of screening content from minors 
and unconsenting adults while retaining large measures of in-
dividual autonomy and choice. 
But in late 1998, it seems unlikely that an idealized PICS 
system will spring up soon without at least some form of gov-
ernment intervention. A relatively small number of pages are 
tongues), head, shoulder, hands or arms, but not any other areas in-
cluding but not limited to neck, breasts, torso, or legs. Innocent 
kissing shows affection and/or love, but creates no reasonable percep-
tion of stronger sexual activity. 
Definitions for RSACi Sex Questions (visited Oct. 18, 1998) <http://www.rsac. 
org/content/register/def/sex.html>. 
47. See Playboy Online (visited Oct. 21, 1998) <http://www.playboy.com/>. 
While the PICS ratings are normally invisible to the user, anyone can see the 
ratings code (if any) of any page by selecting the "view source" function of the 
web browser. 
48. See About RSACi, supra note 39. 
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actually rated according to a PICS rating scheme, and the 
largest Internet browser manufacturer has not yet released a 
PICS-enabled version of the software.49 A PICS rating system 
is perhaps the classic example of a good with strongly positive 
network externalities-it is relatively valueless unt il increas-
ing numbers of people use it, while its value increases rapidly 
with the number of users.so At the present time, the cost and 
effort of learning and implementing the PICS systems,s1 albeit 
quite low, is unlikely to yield satisfactory returns without in-
centives. 
The potential "costs" of easy access for children to porno-
graphic materials, however, are significant. Even beyond the 
difficult-to--quantify, although not insignificant, social costs of 
children viewing indecent material, there is the very real per-
ceptual problem caused by a public view of the Internet as the 
home oflitt le more than what have been described as the "Four 
Horsemen of the Infocalypse": pedophiles, terrorists, drug-
dealers, and money launderers.52 This negative perception 
could limit the Internet's growth as a mainstream commercial 
and communications network, restraining the growth of an 
emerging sector of the economy.s3 Lower growth in the in-
creasingly important Internet industry might raise the spectre 
of market failure, providing incentives for government inter-
vention. And the politics of the underlying issue is likely to 
further energize regulation: protecting children is a powerful, 
bipartisan issue, and the Four Horsemen have few friends in 
government. 
49. See id. 
50. See, e.g., ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICRO-
ECONOMICS 118-20 (3d ed. 1995) ("The Bandwagon Effect"). The argument, as 
made above, is that as more users enable the PICS rating systems on their 
computers (and some percentage of these choose to opt-out of unrated sites), 
the benefit to the producer of self-rating will increase. As the number of rated 
sites increase, the value of PICS-to both the user and the producer-
increases rapidly, encouraging even more use. 
51. This applies to either producer/raters or users/choosers, though the 
costs are especially low for the users. 
52. Wendy Grossman, Signs of Insecurity in Cyberspace, DAILY TELE-
GRAPH (London), July 2, 1998, at 13. 
53. The U.S. Government advanced a version of this argument in Reno v. 
ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997), as an additional and "equally significant" inter-
est to that of protect ing children. ld. at 2351. The Court found the argument 
to be "singularly unpersuasive" as a countervailing interest to free speech. Id. 
1999] FILTERS JVVD THE FIRST A.MENDMEl\fT 771 
Therefore, the time seems ripe for additional government 
involvement in facilitating the screening of Internet content. 54 
The balance of this paper will attempt to describe the permis-
sible scope of the government's activities in relation to the new 
filtering technologies. 
A couple of initial observations may be useful here. First, 
whatever the government does, it will not have to do very 
much. PICS , as with all Internet standards, is likely to achieve 
strong growth due to positive network externalities. The key 
will be to get it started; a litt le "push" may be all that is needed 
to create the self-generating cycle of growth: the r atings be-
come more valuable to users and the creation of ratings be-
comes more valuable to producers (and vice-versa). 
Second, the ratings system chosen in the beginning may 
stick with us. A ratings system that makes strong initial gains 
will likely benefit from the network effects to the detriment of 
competitor systems. Users and producers alike will be at-
tracted to the higher value system, which may be difficult to 
dislodge once it has gained widespread acceptance. This path 
dependence implies that the "market" for competing rating sys-
tems may disappear as PICS itself takes hold, with an initial 
large player becoming the standard.55 Therefore, the implica-
tions of government involvement may, as a result of the eco-
nomics of networks, loom larger than ordinary direct regula-
tion. The stakes seem quite high. 
III. DIRECT OR IMPOSED FILTERING 
As an initial cut at the issue, the Federal, state, or local 
government could simply filter Internet content itself or force 
the filtration of all Internet content by third parties, such as 
ISPs or backbone carriers.56 For example, a state could pass 
legislation that would enable it to filter and block all material 
deemed harmful to minors either using PICS or-as is more 
54. Reno u. ACLU left intact part of the Communications Decency Act, 4 7 
U.S.C. § 223(a) (Supp. 1997), prohibiting the knowing transmission of obscene 
messages to any recipient under 18 years of age. See Reno u. ACLU, 117 S. 
Ct. at 2340; see also A Family Friendly Internet, supra note 26 (noting that 
the decision in Reno u. ACLU "did not affect U.S. laws against obscenity, child 
pornography, and on-line stalking''). 
55. At this juncture, all indications are that the RSACi is well-positioned 
in this regard. See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of 
Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 597-99 (1998). 
56. Backbone carriers are primarily large telecommunications concerns 
that carry the bulk of Internet traffic between major interconnection points. 
772 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83:755 
likely given the current state of the technology-by installing a 
database rating system. This statute is almost certainly un-
constitutional. 
A. THE G ENERAL CASE 
Either the producer whose content was blocked or the user 
who was denied access would have standing to challenge the 
statute. In Reno v. ACLU, the Supreme Court appears to have 
foreclosed any analogy between the Internet and broadcasting 
where content-based intervention is permissible.57 Thus, a fil-
tering-blocking scheme of this sort is a paradigmatic content-
based regulation, singling out sexually-related speech, and 
would be subject to strict scrutiny.ss The government would 
have to show a compelling state interest supporting the filters 
and that the filters are the least restrictive means to achieve 
the ends. 59 While the protection of children from harmful rna-
terials has been held by the Court to be significant, even com-
pelling,6o the Court has also held that "that interest does not 
justify an unnecessarily broad suppression of speech addressed 
to adults."61 Because government-imposed filtering would ap-
ply regardless of the age of the end user, this law would be held 
unconstitutional. 
Any attempt to limit the filtering and blocking to material 
deemed "obscene" under the Miller test62 is unlikely to save the 
statute. While obscenity is unprotected speech,63 the ratings 
system itself is probably not precise enough to avoid sweeping 
in protected speech. 64 
57. 117 S. Ct. at 2343-44. 
58. See id. at 2329; Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State 
Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991). 
59. See Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 118. 
60. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Prince v. Massachu-
setts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
61. Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. at 2346. 
62. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1973). The Miller test 
looks at three factors to determine whether or not material is obscene. The 
factors are "(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary commu-
nity standards would fmd that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the pru-
rient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offen-
sive way, sexual conduct specifically defmed by the applicable state law, and 
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, politi-
cal, or scientific value." ld. (citations omitted). 
63. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
64. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
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Finally, because the filtering and blocking takes place be-
fore the material even reaches the "blocked" users, the law 
might be characterized as a form of prior restraint, and thus 
come before the courts with a "heavy presumption against its 
constitutional validity."65 In this regard, the unique procedural 
aspects of the filtering-blocking system would be significant. 
The Supreme Court has allowed some prior restraints when 
the "administration" of the restraints places the burden on the 
government and allows a rapid appeal to the judiciary.66 In 
this circumstance, however, this "safe harbor" would not apply: 
although the operative "burdens" of the system are unclear,67 
the technology does not contemplate an appeal to the judici-
ary.68 
B. THE SPECIAL P ROBLEM OF LIBRARIES 
One context in which the government filtering issue has 
arisen is public access Internet terminals in public libraries 
and public schoollibraries.69 In Mainstream Loudoun v. Board 
of Trustees,?O one of the first filtering cases to be litigated, the 
government argued for the constitutionality of a public li-
brary's filtering scheme by analogizing it to the selection of li-
brary books in Board of Education v. Pico.7 1 In Pico, the Su-
preme Court held that a school board's removal of several 
books from a school library was unconstitutional in light of the 
"right to receive ideas [as] a necessary predicate to the recipi-
ent's meaningful exercise of his own rights of speech, press, and 
65. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per 
curiam); see also Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963). 
66. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1965). 
67. In one sense, the technology places the burden upon the speaker, as 
she will have to conform the speech to the rubric of the filtering system. 
However, in Freedman, the Court noted the tendency for bureaucratic over-
reach as the animating purpose behind the burden shifting. See id. at 57-58. 
Here the technology, of course, is perfectly consistent. And fmally, the fact 
that the filtering system is fixed and preexisting means that the speaker has 
an immobile target at which to aim; she will be able to perfectly tailor her 
speech to meet the filter. 
68. The volume of content and speed at which it gets filtered would them-
selves be significant impediments to appeal. 
69. See, e.g., Jeri Clausing, In Rejecting Dismissal of Filtering Case, 
Judge Sets High Standard for Libraries, N.Y. TIMES (CYBERTIMES) (April 9, 
1998) <http://www .nytimes.comllibrary/tech/98/04/cyber/articles/09library.html>. 
70. 2 F. Supp. 2d 783 (E.D. Va. 1998). 
71. See Loudoun, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 793; see also Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 
u.s. 853 (1982). 
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political freedom."72 The Court specifically noted, however, 
that its ruling did not affect "the discretion of a local school 
board to choose books to add to the libraries of their schools."73 
Seizing upon this language, the Loudoun County Library ar-
gued that filtering net content was akin to selecting books to 
add to their collection or to receive through an inter-library 
loan system and thus, under the Court's precedent, that the 
"First Amendment does not in any way limit the decisions of a 
public lib1·ary on whether to provide access to information on 
the Internet."74 The Federal District Court for the Eastern 
District of Virginia found this reasoning unpersuasive because 
of the nature of the Internet as a "single, integrated system"75 
and because the plaintiffs in Pica were schoolchildren.76 
But this may not be a complete view of the issue. A close 
look at the doctrine and the technology shows that whether a 
library may filter and block Internet content will turn upon the 
"fit" between the state interests and the implementation of the 
filtering technology itself, although in two different ways. 
First, the government can attack the characterization of its 
use of filtering technology as content-based regulation. In Ren-
ton v. Playtime Theatres ,77 the Court noted that where the 
72. Pico , 457 U.S. at 867. 
73. Id. at 871. 
74. Loudoun, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 792. 
75. Id. at 793 (citation omitted). First Amendment advocates will be wise 
to avoid hanging too much on this factual distinction. Certainly the Internet 
can be viewed as an undifferentiated whole-a system of computer networks 
using the same sets of protocols and allowing ready access to any part of the 
system from any other. But the net can just as easily be viewed with slightly 
more granularity, as a "vast library including millions of readily available and 
indexed publications," according to the Supreme Court. Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. 
Ct. 2329, 2335 (1997). This line offactual argument is also vulnerable to what 
Justice O'Connor described in her dissent in Reno v. ACLU as "gateway" tech-
nology-which "construct[s) barriers in cyberspace" between content. Id. at 
2353-54. The technology of the net is changing so rapidly that viewing it as an 
undifferentiated whole is likely to become increasingly inapt as filtering and 
other "gateway" technologies become more widespread and effective. 
76. See Loudoun, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 795. The Supreme Court has long held 
that the state has special interests in controlling the operation and curricu-
lum of schools and even in "inculcating fundamental values" in schoolchildren. 
Pica, 457 U.S. at 864; see also Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); 
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). The Court has also found that those 
under the age of majority have less First Amendment rights than adults. See 
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
77. 475 U.S. 41 (1986). The Court in Renton found the government inter-
est in zoning regulations to be "substantial," and the zoning itself to be effec-
tive. See id at 50-51. 
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reguJation was intended to cure the "secondary effects" of the 
speech-in that case , to avoid the crime and reduction of prop-
erty values caused by adult theaters-it was not content-based, 
but rather a time, place, and manner regulation subject to 
something like intermediate scrutiny.78 In the library context, 
the government could argue that the imposition of fi lters was 
intended to cure the "secondary effects" of the display of inde-
cent material: a reduction in library traffic, the introduction of 
a "rougher crowd" into the library's patrons, and a general de-
valuing of the "quality" of the library.79 This argument, how-
ever, is limited by Boos v. Barry, which noted that the reaction 
of the listener cannot be a secondary effect under Renton, im-
plying that the government could not advance the protection of 
children as a rationale and still fit within a Renton analysis.so 
The Boos limitation may be dispositive, since although the Su-
preme Court has not clarified a means to distinguish a regula-
tion targeted at secondary effects from one that is content-
based, courts are likely-as a factual matter-to view etTorts to 
filter Internet content as content-based.81 But even if the gov-
ernment is able to convince a court that the filtering is legiti-
mately based on a concern about secondary effects, it must still 
show that the "fit" between filters and the secondary effects is 
reasonable. 82 
78. See id. 
79. In Renton, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, noted the preven-
tion of crime, the protection of the city's retail trade, and the quality of urban 
life as the secondary effects. See id. at 48. 
80. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (noting that the desire to 
prevent "psychological damage" was targeted at the direct effects of the 
speech, not secondary effects). 
81. Professor Tribe argues that laws seen by the courts as related to 
"communicative impact" will receive strict scrutiny, while those that relate to 
"non-communicative impact" will not. LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2, at 790 (2d ed. 1988). Of course, differentiating be-
tween the two is not trivial. See John Hart Ely, Comment, Flag Desecration: 
A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amend-
ment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1975) (arguing that the distinction be-
tween communication-based restrictions and non-communication-based re-
strictions is difficult to discern). Given the Supreme Court's strong support 
for the Internet as a medium for free speech, one suspects that courts will 
look askance at arguments that content regulation on this medium are di-
rected solely at "non-communicative impact." See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 
2329, 2544 (1997) ("[O]ur cases provide no basis for qualifying the level of 
First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this medium."). 
82. Though the required "fit" under the time, place and manner interme-
diate scrutiny test is not stringent, it is non-zero. The physical "screening-off' 
of the Internet access computers from other patrons could be viewed as a far 
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If the Renton argument fails, the level of scrutiny applied 
will then depend upon the breadth of the filters. If the library 
purports to limit access to only the unprotected categories of 
obscene or child pornographic materials as defined by New 
York u. Ferber and Miller, then it need only show a rational ba-
sis for the filtering scheme and a reasonable fit between the in-
terests and the filters.s3 If, however, the library extends be-
yond the t ruly unprotected categories of speech into indecency 
or vague "harmful to minors" standards, the filtering will have 
to be justified by a compelling state interest and be narrowly 
tailored to that interest.84 A state's interest in protecting chil-
dren from indecent speech is substantial, but Reno u. ACLU 
held that "that interest does not justify an unnecessarily broad 
suppression of speech addressed to adults."85 The Court ex-
plained that, "Regardless of the strength of the government's 
interest in protecting children, the level of discourse ... simply 
cannot be limited to that which would be suitable for 
[children] ."86 Therefore, it seems that the library would have to 
bifurcate filtered access to the net between children and adults . 
Filtering on the adult terminals would be limited to obscenity 
and child pornography, while filtering on the children's termi-
nals would be somewhat less circumscribed, although probably 
limited to sexual material of the form discussed in Ginsberg v. 
New York.87 In both cases , however, a crucial issue will be the 
"fit" of the filtering technology; as was noted in the discussions 
more effective (and speech-neutral) method for reducing secondary effects in 
the library. 
83. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765-66 (1982) (holding that ob-
scene material is not entitled to First Amendment protection); Miller v. Cali-
fornia, 413 U.S. 15, 36 (1973) (holding that restrictions on obscene materials 
receive rational basis review). Of course, if the filtering technology in fact 
sweeps broader than the library policy indicates, then courts should read the 
parameters of the technology as the de facto library policy. 
84. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2346 (1997) (applying strict scru-
tiny review to broad restrictions on adult speech designed to protect minors); 
Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of Trustees, 2 F. Supp. 2d. 783, 793 (1988) 
(statutes restricting speech harmful to minors receive strict scrutiny review). 
85. 117 S. Ct. at 2346. 
86. Id. (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74-75 
(1983)). 
87. 390 U.S. 629, 636 (1968) ("[T]he concept of obscenity or of unprotected 
matter may vary according to the group to whom the questionable material is 
directed or from whom it is quarantined."). Importantly, a public school li-
brary may have even more latitude to filter, as content selection within school 
libraries has been upheld to be permissible when grounded upon legitimate 
pedagogical purposes. See Board ofEduc. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 871 (1982). 
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above, the present crop of database ratings systems in par-
ticular are subject to unpredictably large overbreadth and may 
be subject to challenge on that basis.88 Given the present state 
of the technology and current First Amendment doctrine, it is 
likely that public libraries will be severely constrained , if per-
mitted at all , in their ability to broadly filter Internet content. 
The significance of this analysis, however, is that it reveals 
the importance of the evolution of filtering technology. Filters 
with more accuracy and precision-that is, filter s that confi-
dently allow blocking closely limited to unprotected or under-
protected content-will change the landscape of this analysis. 
The revolution of PICS may change the ability of the govern-
ment to constitutionally regulate Internet content. Therefore, 
it is next necessary to consider what the state may permissibly 
do with respect to PICS. 
IV. "INDIRECT" REGULATION: THE SUPPORT OF 
INTERNET LABELING 
Since constitutional limitations on the government's power 
to impose direct filtering will decrease as the technology be-
comes more sophisticated, the government may attempt to in-
fluence the development of filtering technologies. Specifically, 
the government might consider the growth of a label system 
like PICS to be an important precursor to further content 
regulation on the Internet. As noted above, once widespread 
labeling is in place, users would place increasing value on the 
ability to filter out unwanted content, leading to increasing in-
88. See supra note 18 and accompanying text; see also Reno v. ACLU, 117 
S. Ct. at 2344-45; Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 (1972) (holding that 
overbroad statutes are unconstitutional); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S . 449, 
462 (1958) (holding that the government regulation must fit the intended 
ends). The current scope of the overbreadth doctrine is uncertain. In Broad-
rick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973), the Court noted that regulations will 
be invalidated on overbreadth grounds only if "substantially overbroad in re-
lation to the statute's plainly legitimate purpose." Id. at 622. And in Brockett 
v. Spokane Arcades, 472 U.S. 491 (1985), the Court held that a statute suscep-
tible to a narrowing construction will not be held overbroad on the basis of a 
broader construction. See id. at 509. In the filtering and blocking case, courts 
will have ample evidentiary material to consider the quantitative approach of 
Broadrick, though the line between substantial and insubstantial overbreadth 
is not at all clear. Brockett, on the other hand, seems inapplicable, since the 
technological filter at issue is resistant to alternative constructions, broader 
or narrower. 
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centives to label independent of the government mandate.s9 
'l.,he next part will consider some possible approaches the gov-
ernment may take to stimulate the growth of PICS and their 
constitutional validity. 
A. MANDATORY R ATINGS OR LABELING 
An obvious way to support the growth of a PICS labeling 
system is to mandate it. The government could pass a statute 
directly requiring the labeling of Internet content according to 
the PICS standard and back up such a labeling requirement 
with fraud penalties for misrating.9o 
First, a note about an important distinction. As will be 
seen below, it is important at the outset to recognize the criti-
cal difference between mandating the labeling and mandating 
the labeling according to a designated ratings system. The lat-
ter is a classic content-based restriction on speech: the gov-
ernment is distinguishing among categories of speech accord-
ing to content. A claim of impartiality across the established 
categories will not save the statute, as the government cer-
tainly will not endorse or authorize the unprotected categories 
of speech extant in the ratings system. Mandatory labeling ac-
cording to a defined ratings system brings the facts much 
closer to a prescribed orthodoxy than to government neutral-
ity.91 
But the government's objective-the growth of (private) 
regulation of content-may well be served by either form of 
89. This suggests that the government could anticipate the positive net-
work externalities associated with labeling by requiring less than all of the 
net content to be rated. For example, all commercial content could be re-
quired to be rated, creating less of a regulatory burden and decreasing some 
First Amendment impact. 
90. Senator Patty Murphy announced in late summer 1997 that she 
would introduce legislation making the misrating of sites criminally punish-
able. See Danny Westneat, Senator Murray's Internet Controls Draw Fire, 
SEA'ITLE TIMES, July 15, 1997, at A12. To date, however, no such legislation 
has been introduced on a national level. Because the fraud penalties are con-
tingent upon the underlying question of whether the government may directly 
coerce labeling of content, they are beyond the scope of this paper. I mention 
them simply to denote some enforcement mechanism that would get at a cru-
cial problem with self-rating systems: misrating. 
91. Compare West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 
633-34 (1943) (striking down mandatory flag salutes as promoting a govern-
ment orthodoxy) with Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 58 (1976) (upholding dis-
closure requirements as the "least restrictive means" of supporting the gov-
ernment's significant-but politically neutral-anti-corruption interests). 
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regulation. Mandating labeling according to sexual content, for 
example, even without specifying the "levels" or granularity of 
the ratings system, will in essence jumpstart the market for 
ratings systems. Politicians are likely to be happy with any 
rating system that allows parents to filter out unwanted sexual 
content, and savvy legislators are likely to realize that the 
market may produce a more useful system over time than they 
may create through legislation. In any event, the government 
gets what it wants : the enablement of private-probably home-
based-content regulation. Directly specifying the ratings sys-
tem along with mandating the labeling is probably not neces-
sary to encourage the spread of this technology, and avoiding 
this step will reduce the constitutional concerns of the meas-
ure.n Therefore, legislators considering this constitutional dif-
ficulty will likely choose a labeling statute that does not estab-
lish a ratings system. 
But even a statute that does not establish a ratings system 
may be constitutionally vulnerable on several grounds. First, 
and most directly, producer-speakers could bring a First 
Amendment claim on the grounds that the mandatory labeling 
is compelled speech. Second, a related attack would be that 
the scheme compels the speaker-producers to associate with 
the ratings system, and therefore is a violation of the right 
against compelled association. A third approach would be to 
challenge the ratings themselves as not narrowly tailored to 
their purpose, either due to vagueness, overbreadth or both. 
Finally, Professor Lessig has argued that the imposition of a 
PICS system would be unconstitutional on the grounds that in 
choosing a broader filtering scheme than necessary-that is, by 
forcing PICS labeling rather than limiting the access of chil-
dren to indecent speech-the government exceeds its constitu-
tional authority to regulate Internet content.93 However, as I 
demonstrate in this section, as long as the government in-
volvement remains substantially indirect, the PICS-enforcing 
statute is likely to be constitutional. 
92. As I describe more fully below, this is primarily because "avoiding the 
details" appears to exploit the crucial public-private distinction. See infra 
notes 159-69 and accompanying text. 
93. See Lessig, supra note 8, at 665-69. 
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1. The Compelled Speech Attack 
The mandatory labeling of Internet content could be at-
tacked by a producer on the basis that the attachment of labels 
constitu tes compelled speech . The Supreme Court has held 
that the right not to speak is within the protections of the First 
Amendment.94 The right against compelled speech, however, is 
not complete. Specifically, the Court has recognized that the 
government may not force citizens to speak its own views,95 to 
make financial disclosures without a sufficient government in-
terest,96 to speak in a way that is ideologically hateful to the 
individual,97 to speak when speech would create a realistic 
chance of reprisal ,98 or to include additional speech that would 
alter the content of the speaker's message.99 On the other 
hand, the Court has allowed compelled speech where it "better 
enable[s] the public to evaluate" the speech without causing 
additional misunderstandings , 1oo where it causes little bur-
den, IOI or where the government interests are "sufficiently im-
portant" and implemented by the least restrictive means.1o2 In 
addition, the Federal government has a panoply of regulations 
which compel speech, such as the FDA's regulations regarding 
94. See , e.g., Mcintyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 348 (1995) 
(state cannot require individuals to identify themselves in campaign litera-
ture); Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988) (striking 
down requirement that charities reveal the percentage of their funds spent on 
charitable activities); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (state can-
not require an individual to participate in the dissemination of an ideologi-
cally hateful message); Miami Herald Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974) 
(state cannot force a newspaper editor to publish editorial responses); Bar-
nette, 319 U.S. at 633 (compulsory flag salutes are unconstitutional). 
95. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714; Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633. 
96. See Riley, 487 U.S. at 798. 
97. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 4 75 U.S. 1, 17-18 
(1986) (striking down requirement that public utility place third-party news-
letter in mailings to customers). 
98. See Mcintyre, 514 U.S. at 379. 
99. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, 515 
U.S. 557, 559 (1995) (holding that parade organizers had no obligation to al-
low an ideologically opposed organization in their parade). 
100. See Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 480 (1987) (holding that the state 
can compel the placement of a "political propaganda" label on foreign f:tlms). 
101. See id. (holding forced speech constitutional where it places no burden 
on speaker). 
102. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 29 (1986) (holding that the govern-
ment's interest in appearance of a proper political process is a substantial in-
terest that outweighs certain First Amendment values). This is generally 
considered to be strict scrutiny. 
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food and drug information and labeling, or mandatory disclo-
sure under Federal Securities laws. t03 
a. No Burden to First Amendment Rights: The Keene and 
Wileman Bros. Analysis 
The case most factually analogous to a government-imposed 
labeling scheme is Meese v. Keene, in which Keene, a distributor, 
challenged a regulation requiring labeling of material deemed 
by the State Department to be "political propaganda." 104 Keene 
challenged the labeling primarily on the basis that the addition 
of a label to the material-in that case, films-would decrease 
the demand because of the pejorative connotation of the term 
"political propaganda."tos The Supreme Court, however, held 
five to three that the addition of the mandatory label "place [ed] 
no burden on protected expression."I06 Rather, the Court 
103. While I am unaware of any challenge to these compelled speech 
schemes on First Amendment grounds, these regulations may be less consti-
tutionally questionable because they deal with commercial speech, and-at 
least in the case of the FDA regulations-the labels are affixed to products 
rather than to speech. In this sense, Glickman u. Wileman Bros., 117 S. Ct. 
2130 (1997), is instructive. In Wileman Bros., the Court found that compelled 
subsidies for generic fruit advertising did not burden First Amendment rights, 
and instead evaluated the program "under the standard appropriate for the 
review of economic regulation." I d. at 2138. 
104. 481 U.S. at 468. That the underlying speech in Keene was of foreign 
origin (foreign films) does not make the case any less analogous. In the com-
pelled speech context, the First Amendment right is that of the editor (i.e., the 
individual wishing to not speak), not necessarily the original producer of the 
material. See, e.g., Miami Herald Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) 
(discussing First Amendment rights of editors). So in Keene, the asserted 
First Amendment right was that of the distributor, an American citizen. 481 
U.S. at 467, 474 (describing Keene as an attorney, member of the California 
State Legislature, and citizen). Indeed, the Court in Keene explicitly com-
pared the rights at issue to those presented in Lamont u. Postmaster General, 
381 U.S. 301 (1965), and Virginia Pharmacy Bd. u. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), cases involving both domestic 
"editors" and domestic speech. See Keene, 481 U.S. at 475-76, 481-82. Finally, 
there is no hint in the language or reasoning of the Keene opinion that the ori-
gin of the underlying speech was given any weight whatsoever. 
105. Keene, 481 U.S. at 468-69. 
106. Id. at 480. At least one commentator has suggested that Keene is ir-
reconcilable with Riley's "broad language" supporting strict scrutiny for com-
pelled speech. See Chris Kelly, The Spectre of a 'Wired' Nation: Denver Area 
Educational Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC and First Amendment 
Analysis in Cyberspace, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 559, 636 (1997); see also Les-
sig, supra note 8, at 662 n.95. But the cases can simply be harmonized by rec-
ognizing that the Court-in all such cases-first determines whether the 
compelled speech "burdens protected expression." Keene, 481 U.S. at 480. 
While the Court has noted that compelled speech is as constitutionally ques-
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stated that "by compelling some disclosure of information and 
permitting more [Congress] simply required the disseminators 
of such material to make additional disclosures that would bet-
ter enable the public to evaluate the import of the propa-
ganda."l07 Additionally, the Court found the term "political 
propaganda" to be a "broad, neutral [term] rather than a pejo-
rative one."Jos 
Whether the standard applied in Keene or the more tradi-
tional doctrine of compelled speech would apply to the PIGS-
enforcing statute will turn largely upon whether the speaker-
producer can demonstrate a burden on protected expression.l09 
The government would describe Keene as broadly holding that 
merely requiring the labeling of speech does not burden free 
expression, and would argue that the enforced labeling of In-
ternet content via a PICS label would be even less troublesome 
than the labeling in Keene, since the label itself is normally 
readable only by computers. 
The challenger's response would be two-fold. First, she 
could demonstrate the negative impact of a particular PICS la-
tionable as speech regulation, the Court reaches this point after determining 
that the compulsion of speech was as burdensome as direct speech regulation. 
See Tornillo , 418 U.S. at 256. In Wooley and Barnette, the burden on pro-
tected speech was the attempt to promote government orthodoxy (and per-
haps thereby drown out other views). See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 
715 (1977); West Virginia State Bd. ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641-42 
(1943). In Pacific Gas and Tornillo, the burden was much more direct: that 
the right of response was triggered on the basis of earlier speech meant that 
the speaker would be chilled from uttering some types of speech. See Pacific 
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S 1, 18 (1986); Tornillo, 418 
U.S. at 257. And in Mcintyre, the chilling effect from the possibility of repri-
sal was an unquestionable burden. See Mcintyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 
514 U.S. 334, 379-80 (1995). In contrast, the Court in Wileman Bros. found 
that the plaintiffs' "criticisms of generic advertising provide no basis for con-
cluding that the factually accurate advertising constitutes an abridgement of 
anybody's right to speak freely." 117 S. Ct. at 2139-40. And while it is quite 
possible to argue against the Wileman Bros. and Keene decisions on this basis, 
the Court's unifying theme appears to be that the compelled speech must bur-
den in some sense the concomitant rights of speech. I d. at 2138. Therefore, in 
order to raise a First Amendment compelled speech claim, a challenger must 
show a causal link between the compelled speech and a burden on protected 
expression. 
107. Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 480-81 (1987). 
108. Id. at 483. The Court also noted the "respect" for Congress's power to 
define the terms that it uses in legislation. Id. at 484. Because the term was 
defmed neutrally in the statute, and had been widely used without challenge, 
the Court would not attribute a negative meaning. See id. 
109. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text. 
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bel.IIO By labeling content as sexually explicit, the producer 
would be demonstrably excluding potential audience mem-
bers-those who use computers with filter options to block 
sexually explicit material. This is unlike the vague "pejorative 
connotation" alleged in Keene. Here there is a demonstrated 
reduction in audience size. Moreover, the Court in Keene noted 
that the speaker could counteract any negative connotation to-
wards the film by attaching additional labels or explana-
tions.lll In the PICS case, this is not possible-the label trig-
gers the blocking mechanism before there is any opportunity to 
even view the content, and PICS does not allow "explanatory'' 
material in addition to ratings. Second, the speaker-producer 
could note the "burdens" associated with the labeling itself, 
specifically that the cost in time and effort to determine and 
program the label might dissuade further production.ll2 
How this factual "burden" determination will turn out is 
anyone's guess. But it is also irrelevant. Whether Keene ap-
plies or not will determine only the level of scrutiny applied; 
under Keene and Wileman Bros., the Court-applying rational 
basis review-would merely determine whether the law is ra-
tionally related to the asserted interests, which it almost cer-
tainly is. 113 But as I discuss below, there is reason to believe 
that the PICS-enforcing statute would survive intermediate 
and even strict scrutiny. 
110. Ideally, there would be empirical evidence to demonstrate how many 
potential audience members were lost due to a particular rating, such as for 
"sexual activity." 
111. See Keene, 481 U.S. at 481. 
112. In American Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 
1997), one long time Internet expert testified that he tried to imbed PIGS-
compliant labels in his online newsletter site but fmally gave up after several 
hours. See Testimony cited in ACLU, Fahrenheit 451.2: Is Cyberspace Burn-
ing? (visited Oct. 20, 1998) <http://www.aclu.org/issues/cyber/burning.html>. 
This is distinct from the author's experience, where a web page was labeled 
within fifteen minutes and with minimal effort. 
113. The only possible question is whether the PICS statute is likely to be 
at all effective. Given the low level of rationality review, however, it seems 
highly likely that Congress would be given the benefit of the doubt. See 
Glickman v. Wileman Bros, 117 S. Ct. 2130, 2152 (1997) (holding that regula-
tion of economic activity "is plainly permissible short of something so arbi-
trary as to fail the rational basis test"). 
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b. Intermediate Scrutiny: The Content-Neutrality of a PICS 
Statute 
If the hypothetical statute is drawn broadly enough to re-
quire that all Internet speech be labeled rather than singling 
out any particular speech for labeling, then the statute looks 
quite similar on its face to the "content-neutral" provisions 
given intermediate scrutiny in Turner Broadcasting v. FCC.II4 
In Turner, the Court found that the requirement that cable 
television networks carry certain broadcast signals "did not 
burden or benefit speech of a particular content," 11 5 and upheld 
the laws under the O'Brien test. 11 6 In the PIGS-enforcement 
case, the statute on its face applies equally to all speech posted 
on Internet web pages. It does not discriminate according to 
content. The fact that it focuses only on Internet-based speech, 
the argument goes, does not justify strict scrutiny under the 
Court's precedent.II7 
The challenger's primary response to this argument is that 
by forcing labeling according to the content of speech, the 
114. 512 U.S. 622, 663-64 (1994). At issue in Turner were a series of "must 
carry" provisions that forced cable companies to carry local commercial and 
public broadcast stations. The Court upheld these provisions. See id. 
115. Id. at 645. 
116. Id. at 662. Content-neutr.al regulations that impose an "incidental" 
burden on speech are analyzed according to intermediate scrutiny. See 
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968); see also Ward v. Rock 
Against Racism, 491 U.S . 781, 789 (1989). So-called "time, place, and manner" 
regulations are also analyzed in this mode. See, e.g., Clark v. Community for 
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U .S. 288, 293 (1984). Under O'Brien, a content-
neutral regulation will be upheld if: "[1] it furthers an important or substan-
tial governmental interest; [2] if the governmental interest is unrelated to the 
suppression of free expression; and [3] if the incidental restriction on alleged 
First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance 
of that interest." 391 U.S. at 377 (numbering added). The significant analysis 
of the O'Brien test is primarily part [2]; the Court has not closely followed the 
"no greater than essential" restriction in part [3]. See Clark, 468 U.S. at 299. 
117. "It would be error to conclude ... that the First Amendment man-
dates strict scrutiny for any speech regulation that applies to one medium (or 
a subset thereof) but not others." Turner, 512 U.S. at 660. Instead, the Court 
has held that such media discrimination will only raise serious constitutional 
questions in certain circumstances, such as when it targets a small number of 
speakers, and is justified when the differential treatment is based on the spe-
cial characteristics of the medium being regulated. See id. (citing Arkansas 
Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987); Minneapolis Star & 
Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983)). Here, the 
Internet contains a very large number of speakers and the pervasiveness, ease 
of access, and difficulty of public regulation probably avoids the discrimina-
tory concern. 
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PICS-enforcing statute is ipso facto content -based.11 8 This is a 
difficult position, because-if the statute is carefully-drawn-
Congress will leave the ratings and rating systems wholly up 
to private parties. The fact that the statute might require all 
web pages to be rated is probably not enough to raise content-
based questions, because the regulation applies to all web 
pages, regardless of the specific content. The burden of rating 
will be the same on all speakers.ll9 If the challengers could 
show that the "burden" of the PICS-enforcing stat ute applied 
differently to different types of speech-say by introducing fac-
tual findings that labels indicating high sexual or violent con-
tent would reduce traffic or stigmatize the speakers-the ar-
gument gains some force. Although the Court rejected this 
argument in Keene on factual grounds, 120 it appears to have ac-
cepted it to some degree in Riley. 121 But, in the case of PICS, 
the government has the powerful response that all particulars 
of the compelled speech-the individual "levels" of the ratings 
system, for example-are controlled by private parties. The 
compelled speech is not "triggered" by a particular messagel22 
118. Professor Lessig, drawing support from some of the Court's language 
in Riley, makes the more direct claim that compelled speech is inherently con-
tent-based. See Lessig, supra note 8, at 662 n.95. This conclusion, if it was 
ever applicable to the facts of Riley-and I doubt it was-certainly did not 
survive Turner, where the Court not only described Riley as content-based in 
application-noting that the basis of the Riley holding was that "solicitation of 
funds trigger[ed a] requirement to express [a] government-favored mes-
sage"-but also proceeded to analyze the "compelled speech" must-carry pro-
visions as content-neutral regulations meeting intermediate scrutiny. 512 
U.S. at 655. 
119. To be fair to Professor Lessig, he appears to be analyzing a statute 
that would require rating only of what he calls "Ginsberg speech"-speech 
from which the government has a legitimate interest in protecting children. 
See Lessig, supra note 8, at 657-69. A statute only requiring labeling of pages 
with a significant degree of sexual content is plainly content-based; my point 
is that a relatively minor change in the statute leads to a very different result 
and is probably as likely to occur, given the advantages. 
120. The Court simply did not accept that the application of a 
"propaganda" label would "have actually had any adverse impact on the dis-
tribution" of the materials. Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 483-84 (1987). 
121. The Court noted that in the context of fundraising, the compelled dis-
closure of fmancial overhead percentages "could encourage or discourage the 
listener from making a . . . donation [and] would clearly and substantially 
burden the protected speech." Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 
781, 798 (1988). Admittedly, on this point, Riley and Keene are difficult to 
square. 
122. Cf Miami Herald Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); Pacific Gas & 
Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 4 75 U.S 1 (1986). 
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and is not determined by the government.l23 Indeed, the latter 
point makes the PIGS-enforcing statute appear further attenu-
ated from the government-mandated-and-written labels upheld 
in Keene , and perhaps even less questionable. 
Given the present doctrine, whether the PIGS-enforcing 
statute is considered content-neutral will likely tu r n on the in-
terests at issue. That is , the central question is whether the 
government's enablement or support of private/individu al 
regulation (even censorship) is related to th e suppression of 
free expression. The key to this analysis is to recall that the 
('interests related to the suppression of free expression" must be 
those of the government rather than those of private parties. 
'With this fact in mind, the government could put forth at least 
two plausible content-neutral government al interests to ex-
plain its action. 
i. market-facilitation: the analogy to Turner Broadcasting 
In Turner, the Court held that "assuring that the public 
has access to a multiplicity of information sources is a govern-
m ental purpose of the highest order ."124 A similar argument 
might be made in favor of the PIGS-enforcing statute, specifi-
cally that the imposition of "must-rate" rules, like the "must-
carry" rules in Turner, are necessary to ensure the continued 
growth of a diversity of voices on the Internet. 125 In this way, 
123. Cf Riley, 487 U.S. at 798. 
124. Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 663 (1994). I must admit 
that it seems a bit odd to talk of interests in "diversity" as content-neutral. 
Certainly diversity interests are not content-specific, but they seem to imply 
an interest in the different, an interest in anything not currently available, 
which seems less than wholly agnostic. 
125. Relatedly, Turner's fmding that the importance of local broadcasting 
outlets themselves "can scarcely be exaggerated," may support a claim that 
the growth of the Internet itself would be a sufficiently important content-
neutral basis for imposing self-rating. See id. at 663 (citing United States v. 
Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 177 (1968); see also Reno v. ACLU, 117 
S. Ct. 2329, 2344 (1997) (noting the great communicative virtues of the Inter-
net) . However, in Reno v. ACLU, the Court noted that this argument assumes 
that "the unregulated availability of [unwanted content] is driving countless 
citizens away from the medium because of the risk of exposing themselves or 
their children to harmful material." 117 S. Ct. at 2351. Certainly the contin-
ued growth of the Internet seems to repudiate the idea that any stifling is oc-
curring. There are debates about the most appropriate measure of the "size" 
of the Internet (and therefore the size), but nobody seems to think that the 
growth rate is slowing. See, e.g., Jamie Murphy, It's Not the Size that Counts, 
But How You Measure It, N.Y. TIMES (CYBERTIMES) (visited June 5, 1998) 
<http:// www.nytimes.com/library/tech/98/07/cyber/articles/05big.html>. Note, 
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the claim would be one of market failure: that the lack of Con-
gressional action in response to the content control problem 
will lead to migration towards poor second-best solutions that 
will restrict the diversity of voices in much the same way as 
Congress was concerned with when it enacted Turner's cable 
television regulations. 
The most plausible "second-best" solutions to the content-
control problem that may emerge in the absence of government 
regulation are combinations of both convergence on vertically-
integTated ISPs and pervasive third-party censorship. Verti-
cally-integrated ISPs are those which produce and maintain 
their own content as well as provide access to the wider Inter-
net. A familiar example of this is America Online (AOL), the 
most-used ISP in the world, which provides members access to 
the Internet, to its own proprietary content, and to "chat" ar-
eas.l26 A plausible source of AOL's popularity among new In-
ternet users is its commitment to content control-AOL limits 
content within its proprietary area and provides blocking 
services for Internet content. In addition, AOL gains signifi-
cant revenue from advertising, merchandising, and other con-
tent-related sources. 127 In this sense, AOL produces content, 
much like a local television broadcaster. But AOL is also a 
service provider, akin to a cable operator. As the Court noted 
in Turner, vertical integration would encourage providers to 
drop some broadcasters and to favor affiliated programmers.12s 
Similarly, AOL will have little incentive to include others' con-
tent for the benefit of its members and may even have strong 
incentives to block members' access to outsiders' content in an 
however, that time could change this conclusion: it is plausible that the Inter-
net might not reach its potential as a widespread commercial and communica-
tive medium without some way to allay the fears of those concerned about the 
availability of inappropriate materials. For example, the manipulation of 
popular Internet "search engine" results by pornographic web sites is an issue 
likely to resonate with those considering whether to connect to the Internet. 
See, e.g., www.oneplace.sex? Internet Porn Would Be Easy to Filter (or Find), 
SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, June 5, 1998, at 6C (editorial noting that the In-
ternet is turning into a minefield for parents because "their children are ... 
inadvertently being exposed to . . . the profane" and that "[e]ven word 
searches for seemingly innocuous terms can trigger ads for erotica"). 
126. See America Online (visited Oct. 16, 1998) <http://www.aol.com>. 
127. See 1997 Annual Report-America Online, Inc. (visited Oct. 16, 1998) 
<http://www.aol.com/corp/inv/reports/1997/6_financials/6_pg03a.html>. 
128. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 117 S. Ct. 1174, 1190 (1997). 
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effort to decrease the viability of other speakers.129 In short, 
the impossibility of controlling access on the wider Internet 
might lead to a convergence among vertically-integTated access 
providers-those that could respond by offering a large quan-
tity of proprietary or heavily filtered (i.e., "guaranteed suit-
able") material. This convergence would make the non-
integrated content providers less viable, and it could reduce 
the diversity of media outlets available on the Internet. Given 
the Court's "substantial deference to the predictive judgments 
of Congress,"l30 it is at least plausible that an analogy to 
Turner would convince a court that the PICS-enabling statute 
is content-neutral. 
ii. enabling parental controls: supporting the protection of 
children 
A second clearly-defined government interest is the sup-
port of parents (and perhaps others acting in place of parents, 
such as schools) in controlling the sexual and violent content of 
the material their children are exposed to on the Internet. 
This is an enabling interest rather than a content-based inter-
est: the causal link between the interest and the possible sup-
pression of protected speech is weak at best.I31 Therefore, at-
tacks on the statute as content-based would have to overcome 
this public-private discontinuity. Significantly, the Court has 
held that "the First Amendment, the terms of which apply to 
governmental action, ordinarily does not itself throw into con-
stitutional doubt the decisions of private citizens to permit, or 
to restrict, speech."132 In essence, the speaker-producers would 
129. An obvious rejoinder is that users will not put up with this, and will 
either pressure AOL to change its policies, or switch to another ISP. In this 
way, AOL competes in a much more robust market than cable operators, who 
might have a local monopoly. But the cable operators in Turner had, and lost, 
this argument as well-that users could simply use over-the-air signals to 
tune into the local broadcasters. See Turner, 512 U.S. at 661. 
130. Id. at 665. 
131. One possible route of exploration is through a market-based analysis. 
That is, a speaker-producer of protected speech could claim that the existence 
of low-cost private choices regarding censorship would result in the construc-
tive suppression of particular views. Although this case is hard to make-it 
will depend in large part upon a court's acceptance of network externality 
theory and perhaps economic modeling-it is more likely to be a successful 
approach to this public-private discontinuity than direct or indirect attacks on 
the doctrine itself. 
132. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518. U.S. 727, 
737 (1996). 
1999] FILTERS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 789 
have to show that the government interest in enabling and 
empowering private user choices are equivalent to the suppres-
sive interest in direct governmental regulation. There are 
three ways that this might play out, one more likely than the 
others. First, the most likely scenario is that the Court will 
view this as just another cut at the question of "burdens" on 
free expression caused by the PICS-enforcing statute. 133 Be-
cause the burdens to speech are lower in the private-enabling 
regime than in a direct public regulation regime, it is plausible 
to conclude that the Court will find that the intermediate scru-
tiny O'Brien test is satisfied.l34 
The second, and somewhat less likely, scenario is that the 
Court will refuse to blur the public-private distinction here, 
falling back upon the narrow view the Rehnquist Cour t has 
taken towards the state action doctrine.135 Under this frame-
work, because the private interests do not bear a direct causal 
link to government regulatory interests, there would be no 
First Amendment claim at all. Professor Lessig appears to ar-
gue for the inverse form of this scenario (although couching it 
133. The relative burdens analysis is more properly located in the "fit" or 
narrow tailoring inquiry discussed below. See infra notes 142-44, 149-52 and 
accompanying text. 
134. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); see also supra 
note 116 and accompanying text (discussing the O'Brien test and related Su-
preme Court holdings). 
135. Since the early 1980s, the Court has approached the "state action" 
requirement from two perspectives, neither of which seems to weigh in favor 
of equating a private ratings system with state action. The first is that used 
in Blum v. Yaretsky and Rendell-Eaker v. Kahn: that "constitutional stan-
dards are invoked only when it can be said that the State is responsible for the 
specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains." Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 
991, 1004 (1982); see also Rendell-Eaker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840 (1982). 
The second was used in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. and Edmonson v. Lees-
ville Concrete, where the Court looked to two factors: (1) whether state 
authority undergirded the alleged unconstitutional act, and (2) whether the 
litigant must be fairly considered a state actor. See Edmonson v. Leesville 
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 
(1982). The privately-developed PICS-compatible ratings system is not sup-
ported by the PICS-enforcing statute in a Lugar and Edmonson way-the 
government's requirement that labels be applied does not bear a causal link to 
a particular private ratings system-for in the hypothetical PICS-world, a 
(private) market for ratings systems develops. See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 8, 
at 663. And the private creator of a private ratings system can hardly be 
fairly described as a state actor; indeed, there is no certainty that the market-
developed ratings systems would even square well with Congressional inter-
ests (a risk that Congress may have to take when conceding the details of 
ratings to private parties). 
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in other terms as discussed below), 136 contending that enforced 
PICS would be unconstitutional because of the changes in the 
underlying architecture of speech distribution. 137 While there 
is perhaps reason to be uneasy about even privately-developed 
filtering and labeling schemes, as a descriptive matter, the cur-
rent doctrine of the public-private distinction does not appear 
to support the conclusion that these schemes are unconstitu-
tional.138 
The third scenario is that the Court may fail to differenti-
ate between the government's interests and its motivation. If 
the Court concluded that the government is motivated by the 
desire to suppress speech in its implementation of the PIGS-
enforcing statute, and it equated this motivation with a gov-
ernment interest to suppress expression, the private and public 
"interests" would appear to be aligned, allowing the Court to 
impose strict scrutiny in its review of the statute. However, I 
believe that this is an unlikely result given the presence of the 
two content-neutral government interests noted above and the 
reluctance of the Court to inquire deeply into legislative moti-
vation.139 
Finally, any discussion about the appropriateness of 
equating the interests of private ratings developers with the 
government's interest cannot overlook the fact that this gets a 
plaintiff only part of the way. The final-and crucial-step of 
"compelling speech" in this process is performed by the 
speaker-producer herself when she selects the content she 
wants to ban from her computer screen. To be sure, she is 
heavily constrained by the requirement to rate and the par-
ticulars of the rating system (or systems) that she chooses, but 
she still has a measure of choice and consideration that no 
136. Lessig argues that a PICS-enforcing statute would be unconstitu-
tional because it is not narrowly-tailored and runs afoul of the Court's deci-
sions in Lamont u. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965) and Bolger u. 
Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983). See Lessig, supra note 8, at 
666-67. 
137. See Lessig, supra note 8, at 666. 
138. This is not to criticize Professor Lessig's efforts to change the thinking 
about private-public distinctions. His efforts to do so are important. My in-
tent here, however, is to note how the present doctrine might apply to these 
issues, to promote a full understanding of the underlying questions involved. 
139. The Court has often disavowed analysis based on legislative motiva-
tion. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) ("It is a fa-
miliar principle of Constitutional law that this Court will not strike down an 
otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative 
motive."). 
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plaintiff in any of the Court's compelled speech decisions has 
had.I40 
Before moving on to the strict scrutiny analysis, it is im-
portant to consider how the PICS-enforcing statute will fare 
under the "no greater than essential" requirement of the 
O'Brien test.I41 The statute is very likely to survive this re-
quirement, primarily because the Court has not closely fol-
lowed the original standard. 142 In Turner, the Court described 
the "fit" under intermediate scrutiny as satisfied if the 
"regulation promotes a substantial government interest that 
would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation."I43 
This new lesser standard for the "fit" would probably be met by 
the PICS-enforcing statute given the government interest and 
the absence of effective alternatives to governmental interven-
tion. Given the interests at stake and the relatively low bur-
den imposed by the PIGS-enforcement requirement, the statute 
is likely to survive this element of the O'Brien standard and be 
upheld as a content-neutral provision.l44 
140. See Glickman v. Wileman Bros., 117 S. Ct. 2130 (1997) (plaintiffs 
forced to pay for generic advertising;); Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 
487 U.S. 781, 798 (1988) (forced to disclose particular fmancial details); 
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (forced to be a "government bill-
board"); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (forced to disclose contributors); 
Tornillo v. Miami Herald Co., 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (forced to print others' 
speech); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) 
(forced to salute flag). 
141. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); see also supra 
note 116 and accompanying text (discussing the O'Brien test and related Su-
preme Court holdings). 
142. See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 
288, 299 (1984) (holdirig that the Court of Appeals' view that there were less 
speech-restrictive alternatives available was no more than a disagreement 
with the Park Service about the proper implementation of a policy, and that 
O'Brien does not "assign to the judiciary the authority to replace the Park 
Service as the manager of the Nation's parks"). See generally Ely, supra note 
81, at 1486-88 (noting the "apparent discontinuity" in the Court's approach to 
the less restrictive alternative analysis). 
143. Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 622 (1994) (citing Ward v. 
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 799 (1989)). This is related to the discussion of 
equally effective alternatives below. See infra notes 149-53 and accompanying 
text. 
144. Lessig correctly notes that there are differences in the "narrowly-
tailored" requirement in the content-based and content-neutral cases, but ar-
gues that a PICS-enforcing statute would fail either primarily because "[s]uch 
a regime would result in a wider range of filtered speech than the legitimate 
interests of government would allow." Lessig, supra note 8, at 665 n.101. As I 
noted above, I view this as another approach to the private-public distinction 
that these issues raise. See supra text accompanying notes 123-124. Left out 
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c. S trict S crutiny 
In Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court upheld the manda-
tory disclosure of large donors to political campaigns notwith-
standing the applicat ion of strict scrutiny because the re-
quirement was the least restrictive means of addressing the 
Congress's "substantial" interest in "curbing the evils of cam-
paign ignorance and corruption."145 The government's interest 
in passing the PICS-enforcing statute may warrant similar 
treatment. The statute is intended to protect children, an in-
terest the Court h as described as compelling. 146 Relatedly, and 
equally importantly, the statute is overwhelmingly intended to 
empower parents to control the content of materials viewed by 
their children. The Court has called the right of parents to di-
rect the upbringing of their children "cardinal"147 and has re-
peatedly recognized the strong government interest in sup-
porting these activities.l4S Given the explicit joinder of these 
two already significant interests , the Court would probably 
find that the government interest in enacting the PIGS-
enforcing statute is compelling. 
Then the critical issue becomes the relationship between 
the PICS-enforcing statute and the government's interests or 
the "fit" between means and ends. In the strict scru-
tiny/compelled speech context, the Court has required the use 
of the "least restrictive means."149 In other strict scrutiny 
cases, the Court has analyzed whether the statute was 
"narrowly tailored" to the governmental interests.1so But Pro-
fessor Volokh has noted that the Court's most recent applica-
tion of strict scrutiny, in Reno v. ACLU, used an "equally effec-
of Lessig's claim is the recognition that the "wider range of filtered speech" 
would result from a myriad of individual private choices, not from govern-
ment action to suppress speech. I do not argue t!lat the PICS-enforcing stat-
ute will not result in more filtered speech-it surely vvill-I simply argue that 
where the filtering is a private concern, it cannot be analyzed as if it were 
state action. 
145. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 68. 
146. See Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989); Ginsberg 
v. New York, 390 U .S. 629, 636 (1968). 
14 7. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). 
148. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978); Ginsberg , 390 
U.S. at 639. 
149. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 68. 
150. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims 
Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1995); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992); Boos v. 
Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988). 
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tive alternative" test to strike the CDA. i5I In Reno, the Court 
held that the burden on speech was unacceptable because "less 
restrictive alternatives would be at least as effective" in 
achieving the government 's ends .152 
Applying this doctrine, the "fit" of the PICS-enforcing stat-
ute can be viewed in two ways. F irst , the (theoretical) preci-
sion and efficiency of a PICS-enabled system is wholly un-
precedented; the cheap labels, self-rating requirement, and 
empowerment of parents would appear to be quite narrowly 
tailored to the twin interests of protecting children and sup-
porting parents . Unfortunately, it compels labeling of all 
speech, even that which the government does not have an in-
terest in shielding from minors, although the Court held in 
Ginsberg that some spillover effects would not render a law un-
constitutional.I53 Certainly "some" allowance for spillover does 
not imply that the spillover could necessarily reach all speech 
under a Ginsberg set of facts. But spillover implies both quan-
titative and qualitative judgments, and it is worth remember-
ing here that the burden on speakers-the requirement to rate 
pages-is much lower than the flat prohibition on sales consid-
ered in Ginsberg. So while the spillover in the PICS-enabling 
case is much broader, it would be less burdensome, and thus 
might be seen by the Court as roughly equivalent to the statute 
at issue in Ginsberg. 
The second, and I suspect more difficult, issue for the 
PICS-enforcing statute is whether the Court will find it to be 
"effective" enough. The government will have to convince the 
Court that the labeling requirement is going to work at least as 
151. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Shielding Children, and Tran-
scending Balancing, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 141, 148-49 (1997). As Volokh notes, 
the Reno v. ACLU test is significantly less protective of speech: the govern-
ment could overcome the "narrowly tailored" requirement by developing fac-
tual fmdings that the asserted alternatives are not as effective. "The pregnant 
negative in the Court's reasoning is that, had there really been no equally ef-
fective alternatives (as in fact there are not), the CDA should have been up-
held." Id. at 157. In criticizing this approach, Volokh disputes that "tagging," 
as a factual matter, would be as effective as the CDA's flat ban. See id. at 149. 
152. Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2346 (1997). 
153. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636-37 (1968). In Reno v. ACLU, 
the Court noted that the spillover argument cannot be used to justify the 
"unnecessarily broad suppression of speech addressed to adults." 117 S. Ct. at 
2335. As long as the Court determines that the burden on speaker-producers 
caused by forced labeling is small, then this "narrowly tailored" argument 
would apply. 
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effectively as any other equally-restrictive alternative. 154 The 
challengers may argue that the PICS-enforcing scheme does 
not protect children well enough or that it is likely to be too 
complicated to effectively support parental choices. 155 But if 
the Court maintains its current mode of analyzing the "fit" re-
quirement on a sort of sliding scale between the burdens and 
effectiveness of the law,l56 the low burdens of the PICS statute 
will weigh in favor of it being found constitutional. 
In sum, the outcome of the compelled speech attack on a 
PICS-enforcing statute depends largely upon two questions: 
whether the Court finds that the requirement to rate pages 
burdens First Amendment rights, and whether the Court ac-
cepts the possible content-neutral rationales. If the answer to 
either of those questions is yes, then the statute will likely be 
found constitutional under current doctrine. If the Court de-
termines that the burden on speech is slight enough to bring 
the case into a Meese v. Keene or Glickman v. Wileman Bros. 
analysis, it will find that First Amendment issues are not pres-
ent on the facts and uphold the law under rational basis re-
view.l57 Or, if the Court defers to the content-neutral state in-
terests of facilitating the diversity of speech on the Internet or 
enabling parental protection of children, then the Court is 
likely to find the law constitutional under O'Brien intermediate 
scrutiny.l58 If, however, the Court decides that the law is both 
154. This strict scrutiny framework-the requirement for the law to be 
"narrowly tailored," "equally effective," and/or "least restrictive"-appears to 
set up a form of sliding scale analysis. The more restrictive the law (i.e., the 
more burdensome on speech), the more closely aligned to the interests as-
serted and effective it must be. Likewise, laws with little restrictions or bur-
dens may not be forced to be as closely tailored. See Volokh, supra note 151, 
at 193-94. Volokh argues that this "weighing'' of the benefits and burdens is 
judicially inadministrable, and that the Court would be better served in de-
veloping more categorical rules regarding substantial and insubstantial bur-
dens. See id. at 194. While I share Professor Volokh's desire for clear rules, 
the Court itself has made no signs that it intends to move away from the pre-
sent mode of analysis. See generally Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. at 2335. 
155. For example, children would still be able to access improper material 
from computers other than their parents', or might be able to break the code 
protecting the rating choices on their home computer. The PICS-enforcing 
statute also assumes that parents with Internet connections would be knowl-
edgeable enough to implement the controls. Both of these questions are dis-
tinctly factual in nature, and ones I think can go either way. 
156. See supra note 14 7 and accompanying text. 
157. See supra notes 102-10 and accompanying text (discussing the criteria 
the Court uses for determining which standard of review applies). 
158. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). 
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burdensome and supported by content-based interests , then 
the Court will apply strict scrutiny. In this context, the com-
pelling state interests of protecting children and supporting 
parents as compared to the slight burden on speakers might 
save the law, although the case is much closer. 
2. Interfering with the Architecture of the Speech Market 
A second approach a challenger could take to the govern-
ment's implementation of a PICS-enforcing statute is to argue 
that the statute exceeds the constitutional limitations on the 
government's power to interfere with the architecture of 
speech.l59 Professor Lessig has described the basis of this 
claim as follows: 
If the government has a legitimate interest in filtering speech of kind 
X, but not speech of kind Y and Z, and there are two architectures, 
one that would filter speech X, Y and Z, and one that would filter only 
speech of kind X, then Congress may constitutionally push technolo-
gies of the second kind, but not the first. It may push architectures 
that filter speech of kind X only, and not architectures that facilitate 
the filtering of speech of kind X, Y, and Z. 160 
Therefore, the argument goes that because Congress may le-
gitimately directly block a minor's access to certain types of 
speech, it may not require PICS-labeling, as PICS is an archi-
tecture that enables broader speech filtering.l61 While innova-
tive and thought-provoking, this "architectural" approach is 
difficult to support under present doctrine or theory.l62 
The essence of the architecturalists' constitutional claim is 
that government-enforced labeling would change the nature of 
speech distribution on the net from a default of non-
discrimination to one of discrimination. This, the argument 
goes, is equivalent to forcing everyone to request speech before 
they receive it, or "as if the state required that all magazines 
be vended from behind counters, accessible only upon re-
159. See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 8, at 665-67. 
160. ld. at 665. 
161. See id at 668. 
162. AB an initial matter, it is important to note that the architecture that 
would support broader filtering does so only by private parties. The pub-
lic/private distinction-as discussed above-matters a great deal in this 
analysis. See supra notes 122-40 and accompanying text. This "architectural" 
approach can thus be (fairly, I think) boiled down to a contention that that the 
government may not enable broader private regulation if narrower public 
regulation is available. And while it is entirely likely that this argument is a 
good principle of public policy, the more significant question is whether it has 
support in the Constitution. 
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quest."l63 But even if one accepts that this is a change in the 
state of speech distribution on the Internet,164 the argument 
appears to assume a statute that requires labeling and speci-
fies the labels themselves .165 A law that merely requires gener-
alized labeling and leaves the details up to private parties-as 
we have assumed heretofore-would not raise the same issues. 
This is not "all magazines behind the counter" but rather a rule 
that the "counter" must exist for private parties to use if they 
choose. Concededly, the market may well force a speaker-
producer of sexually-oriented (yet protected) material to vend 
her magazine from behind the counter, otherwise the shop-
keepers, themselves under pressure from the easily-offended 
shop-choosing public, will not stock the magazine anymore. 
Thus, the architecturalists' quarrel is with the imposition of 
the counter when the government could have simply required 
that some magazines could only be sold with proof-of-age-
indeed, behind a counter.l66 
If one recasts the architectural claim against the PIGS-
enforcing statute that we have considered here-one that 
mandates broad labeling, but does not mandate a particular 
rating system or require filtering-its weaknesses become 
readily apparent. Bolger167 and Lamont!68 appear to limit the 
government's ability to filter and block itself, except in very 
narrow circumstances. That much is uncontroversial-and 
unlike the PICS-enforcing statute hypothesized in this section. 
163. Lessig, supra note 8, at 668. 
164. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2342 (1997); Lessig, supra 
note 8, at 669. 
165. Indeed, it appears to assume a statute that requires PICS labeling of 
only that speech which is deemed to be harmful to children. See Lessig, supra 
note 8, at 666-68. 
166. The architecturalists' argument is thus "exposed" (though it is clear 
enough not to need exposure) as another version of the argument against the 
rigid public/private distinction established by Supreme Court doctrine: that 
courts should consider the enablement of private regulation on (nearly) the 
same footing as direct public regulation. See supra note 135 and accompany-
ing text. Admittedly, PICS presents this issue pretty squarely-the network 
effects and unintended consequences of labels make powerful arguments in 
favor of a more flexible state action doctrine. It just doesn't work under the 
current technological and legal situation. 
167. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 69 (1983) (striking 
down a government ban on direct-mail advertisements). 
168. Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965) (striking down a 
requirement that postal recipients specifically request delivery of "communist 
propaganda"). 
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But Rowanl69 appears to go no further than this; at worst, the 
case appears to be silent on the proposition of whether the gov-
ernment can it self design and enforce a ratings system.l7° Ad-
ditionally, I believe Rowan does not even begin to address the 
constitutionality of a statute that requires labeling but does 
not provide the labels. Because the architecturalists rely on 
cases that themselves appear to recognize the public-private 
distinction-or at least lend no authority to ignoring it-the 
architectural approach appears to offer little response to a 
169. Rowan v. United States Post Office, 397 U .S. 729 (1970). 
170. I would argue, however , that Rowan does not necessarily compel the 
conclusion that the government may not be involved in the design of ratings 
systems themselves. While the Post Office in that case merely provided a 
ministerial function, the basis of the decision is clearly that user-selected 
choices are constitutionally permissible. See Rowan, 397 U.S. at 737 
("Nothing in the Constitution compels us to listen to or view any unwanted 
communieation .... The ancient concept that 'a man's home is his castle' into 
which 'not even the king may enter' has lost none of its vitality ... . "). There 
is no suggestion in Rowan that the government may not in some cases further 
assist the addressee in blocking unwanted mail, just an offhanded remark 
that "Congress provided this sweeping power [to block to the addressee] not 
only to protect privacy but to avoid possible constitutional questions that 
might arise from vesting the power to make any discretionary evaluation of 
the material in a governmental official." ld. This statement implies that the 
government may not itself rate or label speech, but I believe it is silent to the 
question of whether the government may create labels for others to use. 
The relevant question that we should ask whether Rowan answers is the 
following: may the Post Office, in support of addressee's blocking choices, cre-
ate a set of categories for content sent in the mails (presumably including 
various categories that many addressees might fmd offensive) and force mail-
ers to categorize their mail as such? I am envisioning a sort of second zip 
code, containing ratings. Addressees could select which categories of content 
they did not wish to receive, and their choices would be administered by the 
Post Office. Under Rowan, the addressee has the unquestionable right to 
block unwanted mail, and-significantly-the Court tells us that the ad-
dressee need not see individual items before they are blocked. See id. at 738 
("The continuing operative effect of a mailing ban once imposed presents no 
constitutional obstacles; the citizen cannot be put to the burden of determin-
ing on repeated occasions whether the offending mailer has altered its mate-
rial so as to make it acceptable. Nor should the householder have to risk that 
offensive material come into the hands of his children before it can be 
stopped."). While not crystal clear, I believe this may be fairly read to support 
the dual propositions that the Post Office may help reduce the burdens of 
blocking from the addressee, and that the addressee need not actually see or 
know the specifics of the material blocked. And while it is probably a stretch 
to thus claim that Rowan allows government-imposed labeling under govern-
ment-designated categories, it makes much more questionable the claim that 
Rowan forbids the government from designing (and requiring) rating systems. 
See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 8, at 668 (arguing that "Rowan limits the govern-
ment's power" to design rating systems). 
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statute exploiting the public-private distinction that it appears 
to brush aside. 
3. PIGS-Enforcement as Compelled Association 
A third-and I believe more useful-attack against the 
PICS-enforcing statute is that it unconstitutionally compels 
the speaker to associate herself with the views of others by 
forcing her to label her page according to a ratings system that 
she may find abhorrent. 171 In Abood v. Detroit Board of Educa-
tion, the Court recognized a right to refuse to associate, at least 
when it involved objectionable views. 172 Using the reasoning in 
A bood , the speaker-producer could claim that placing the pri-
vate r ating developer's label on her speech would constitute a 
forced association of her speech with the ideas established by 
the rating developer. Because this approach explicitly recog-
nizes the existence of the private third party ratings developer, 
it may be more factually descriptive of the circumstances and 
more likely to succeed than either the compelled speech or ar-
chitectural challenges described above. 
Plainly, the PICS-enforcing statute does not require the 
speaker-producer to finance or endorse the rating system. But 
this leaves the argument that the rating systems themselves 
are ideologically-based, and that forcing a speaker to choose 
from a range of labeling options provided by another is 
equivalent to associating herself with that ideological view-
point.m That is, if a ratings system offers a choice of one to 
171. For example, she may fmd the "levels" of the ratings system to be 
wholly inadequate or offensive in some way. She may feel that the system 
does not provide her an opportunity to adequately express her rating of her 
content, or may feel offended by having to rate her page for sexual content 
even where it contains no such content. 
172. 431 U.S. 209, 234 (1977) (striking down compelled fees from Union 
members insofar as they were used to support causes members found objec-
tionable). This freedom of "non-association" has been limited by later cases to 
those organizations which are expressive in purpose. See, e.g., Hurley v. 
Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, Inc. 515 U.S. 557, 573 
(1995) (upholding parade organizers' rights to exclude groups wishing to 
march); New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 8 (1988) 
(upholding anti-discrimination law targeted at some classes of private clubs); 
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 611 (1984) (upholding anti-
discrimination law as applied to the organization). 
173. Note here that I am making an assumption-one that I contend is 
reasonable-that the insertion of the PICS "tags" does not alter the content of 
the speaker's message. Because PICS tags are invisible to the viewer, they do 
not affect the reaction or impact of the message merely by virtue of their in-
sertion. This assumption distinguishes this case from Hurley, where distinct 
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five on a "sexuality" scale, does the required selection of one of 
the five options constitute association with the ratings system 
developer's views on sexuality? 
However, in order to succeed on this basis, the Court 
would have to adopt a slightly different view on the strands of 
the compelled speech and association cases. The underlying 
theory would have to be that just as the government cannot 
force citizens to espouse the government's views, the government 
cannot force the citizens to espouse the views of a private party. 
This position would find support in Tornillo 174 and Pacific Gas 
& Electric,m in which forced rights of access for others' views 
were struck down, albeit as content-based compelled speech 
regulations.1 76 One could also point to Elrod v. Burns, in which 
the Court barred a state from conditioning public employment 
on the association with a political party, for support.177 How-
ever, other precedent may limit the potential of the forced as-
sociation with private parties argument. The main limitations 
are found in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robinsl78 and 
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. 179 In Pruneyard, the Court refused 
to find that a state-forced right of access violated a shopping 
center owner's First Amendment rights because the private 
third parties would: (1) "not likely be identified with [the 
views] of the owner,"tso and (2) because the owner could 
"expressly disavow" any connection with the others' message 
by posting signs. lSI In Wileman Bros., the (5-4) majority deci-
sion rejected the compelled speech/association claim of farmers 
who objected to being forced to financially support government-
sponsored generic advertising for their products. The Court's 
holding rested in part upon the fact that "requiring [plaintiffs] 
to pay the assessments [for advertising] cannot be said to en-
gender any crisis of conscience," because the advertising was 
intended to help the plaintiffs business. 182 Viewed as a whole, 
the cases might be interpreted as prohibiting government 
ideological anathema was found unnecessary to the compelled association 
claim. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 574-75. 
174. Miami Herald Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
175. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986). 
176. See Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 20-21; Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258. 
177. 427 U.S. 347,371 (1976). 
178. 447 u.s. 74 (1980). 
179. 117 S. Ct. 2130 (1997). 
180. Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 75. 
181. Id. at 87. 
182. Wileman Bros., 117 S. Ct. at 2139. 
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mandates that effectively force citizens to associate with the 
views of private third parties where they conflict with one's 
own, except where one could effectively disavow such vievYS. 
On this reading of the precedent, the PICS-enforcing st a tute 
would be unconstitutional because it forces speaker-producers 
to associate themselves with the speech of others, by labeling 
their pages according to a third party rating system with which 
they may not agree, without providing an opportunity for disa-
vowal.l83 
The essential hurdle posed by this approach is primarily a 
factual one: a challenger would have to convince the Court that 
ratings systems are ideological in nature and that the 
"constraint" imposed by the need to work within the bounda-
ries of another's rating system imposed a significant expressive 
burden. Certainly the set-up of a rating system-the choices of 
categories to be used, levels to offer, the scope of the options-
would appear to have significant expressive characteristics.IS4 
They certainly reflect a particular view of certain types of 
speech. The more difficult question, however, is whether these 
expressive choices are burdensome to a speaker-producer to a 
degree that the Court would feel significant enough to warrant 
invalidation.1ss Self-rating means that the ratings system de-
veloper has-theoretically at leastJS6_no say regarding which 
level is selected, although the anecdotal evidence so far shows 
that the developers will probably attempt to make the selection 
of their labels as objective as possible.l87 Given the correct set 
of facts, i.e., an especially constraining set of choices, a ratings 
183. The PICS system does not contemplate the introduction of additional 
information beyond the rating labels themselves, so a speaker-producer has 
no opportunity to explain or disavow the rating. See supra note 112 and ac-
companying text. 
184. See supra notes 37-48 and accompanying text. 
185. In Wileman Bros., the Court noted that the "mere fact that objectors 
believe their money is not being well-spent does not mean [that] they have a 
First Amendment complaint." 117 S. Ct. at 2140 (citations omitted). 
186. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (describing how one ratings 
system, RSACi, forces self-raters using the system to affirm an "agreement" 
between the rater and the system developers, and noting that the current 
agreement contains provisions for the developers themselves to rate pages if 
disputes arise). To the extent that the ratings systems developers inject 
themselves into the rating and labeling process, arguments in favor of forced 
association only increase. 
187. Objectivity can be increased by closely defming the content that each 
level can contain. See supra note 46 (discussing the great detail involved in 
the RSACi rating system defmitions). This interest in objectivity can be as 
easily ascribed to a desire for accuracy as to any desire to impose ideology. 
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developer that is highly ideologically-based and perhaps will-
ing to rate pages himself, this claim may well succeed where 
other approaches have failed. Because the compelled associa-
tion approach directly addresses the private nature of the rat-
ings systems, in the long run it may turn out to be a useful 
check on the scope of publicly-enabled-but-privately-imple-
mented speech regulation. Iss 
B. :MARKET-INFLUENCING TECHNIQUES 
A third major approach Congress might use to get at con-
tent regulation on the Internet would be to engage in a series 
of indirect activities that have the effect of encouraging-or 
perhaps coercing-further filtering and blocking by speaker-
producers and end users. These market-influencing techniques 
would come in various forms, two examples of which are al-
ready seen in proposed legislation: (1) a requirement that ISPs 
provide-at no charge or at cost-software designed to permit 
customers to limit access to material that is unsuitable for 
children;l89 and (2) a requirement that schools and libraries re-
questing "universal service assistance" subsidies from the Fed-
eral government and local telecommunications carriers certifY 
to the FCC that they have selected and installed (or will in-
stall) a system to block matter deemed to be inappropriate for 
minors.l90 Some other techniques could be used, such as re-
quiring all official government web sites to rate their pages or 
by only purchasing software with filtering capabilities built-
in.l91 In their essence, these influencing techniques seek to do 
188. Professor Lessig in particular notes that a chief danger of PICS lies in 
what he calls "upstream" filtering rather than simply user filtering. See Les-
sig, supra note 8, at 660-61. I share his concern on this point-upstream fil-
tering raises issues quite different from those discussed above. But I think 
that a compelled association approach to this concern may be more helpful 
than the attack on the public-private distinction that Lessig suggests. Under 
a compelled association approach, ratings systems supported by a PIGS-
enforcing statute would become more likely to be seen as "compelled" as they 
moved further upstream, because of market power and scope of end users 
covered. Admittedly, my approach relies upon a PICS-enforcing statute to 
create a nexus to the government. Then again, so do other analyses. See, e.g., 
Lessig, supra note 8. 
189. See Internet Freedom and Child Protection Act of 1997, H.R. 77 4, 
104th Cong. (1997); Family-Friendly Internet Access Act of 1997, H.R. 1180, 
104th Cong (1997). 
190. See Safe Schools Internet Act of 1998, H.R. 3177, 104th Cong (1998). 
191. The Federal Government used a purchasing-type market-influencing 
technique to promote the development of key escrowed encryption technology. 
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indirectly-create a regime of content regulation on the net-
what Congress may not (or may not want to) do directly. As 
such, they raise questions regarding how the doctrine of uncon-
stitutional conditions would apply to the new media-and th e 
new market-of cyberspace. 
Put most simply, the doctrine of unconstitutional condi-
tions forbids the government to grant a benefit on the condition 
that the recipient surrender a constitutional r ight, even if the 
government has the right to withhold the benefit altogether. 192 
Thus, the government may bar feder ally-funded family plan-
ning counselors from mentioning abort ion in pregnancy coun-
seling193 but cannot selectively exempt some magazines from 
state taxation based on content .l94 Th e doctrine is commonly 
criticized by commentators as "riven with inconsistencies,"195 
although as a general principle it is often supported. 196 In this 
section, I will briefly consider three situat ions in which uncon-
stitutional conditions are most likely to arise with respect to 
Internet content filters : subsidization, procurement, and taxa-
tion. 
1. Conditioned Subsidization 
One candidate for an unconstitutional conditions analysis 
is the government's provision of subsidies for Internet use (or 
speech) on the condition that the recipients install and/or use 
filtering software.197 As an initial matter , identifYing the par-
t icular claimant is important here. In one (not so hypothetical) 
version of the subsidization with strings issue, the government 
ties grants to public schools or libraries for improving their in-
frastructures with the requirement that filtering and blocking 
See Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor is the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper 
Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 709, 769-772 (1995). 
192. For excellent doctrinal and theoretical treatments of the issue, see 
David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neu-
trality in Government-Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675 (1992); Kathleen 
Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1989); Rich-
ard Epstein, The Supreme Court 1987 Term-Foreword: Unconstitutional 
Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4 
(1988). 
193. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
194. See Arkansas Writers Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987). 
195. Sullivan, supra note 192, at 1416. 
196. See id. at 1418-19; Epstein, supra note 192, at 15; Cole, supra note 
192, at 681-82. 
197. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 192, at 1419. 
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software be installed on the eomputers. Here, privity matters. 
Therefore, the ':righ t" that- is being pressured by the gTants is 
something along the lines of an editorial right delegated to the 
local school and library boards , not a schoolchild's or library 
patron's right to receive information. 198 This editorial right is 
likely to have First A __ mendment status: school offi cials have 
long been r ecognized to ha\re broad authority over th e conduct 
of their schools;l 99 and the editorial right has been fully recog-
nized as a critical component of free expression.200 Arguably, a 
governmental requirernent t o filter and block certain m aterial 
would constitute a burden OD. these rights.2o1 
Given the right and the (arguable) burden caused by the 
condition, vmuld this subsidy-with-strings be upheld? In these 
types of cases , "the Court has attempted to .. . [distinguish] 
denials of benefits that operate as 'penalt ies' on speech from 
those that operate as mere 'nonsubsidies.,202 Essentially, the 
Court views some spheres of government activity as encom-
passing its role as the regulator and others as pertaining to its 
roles as manager or educator. In the first role, abridgements of 
speech are seen as suspect and given heightened scrutiny. In 
the second, only minimal scrutiny is required.203 This distinc-
tion materializes in the cases as follows: (1) the government 
may require some financial or physical segregation between 
198. The Court has long recognized a right to receive information inherent 
in the First Amendment. See, e.g., Board ofEduc. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867-
68 (1982). Note that the end users-who of course are not privy to the bar-
gain-would still perhaps be able to bring a First Amendment challenge 
against the school or library on the basis of government-imposed filtering. See 
supra Part III. 
199. See, e.g., Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 70, 81 (1979) (upholding a 
state statute forbidding teacher certification of non-citizens); Meyer v . Ne-
braska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923) (noting that "the state may do much, go very 
far, indeed, in order to improve the quality of its citizens"). 
200. See Miami Herald Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974). 
201. This assumes the "editorial" right is burdened enough to raise the un-
constitutional conditions issue in the first place. It is plausible that the Court 
would not consider the "burden" placed upon the right-the alteration in local 
editorial control-to rise to the level required. It is well-recognized that the 
constitutional interest at issue must rise to the level of a right ordinarily pro-
tected by strict judicial review. See Sullivan., supra note 192, at 1427. So the 
operative question is whetheT, standing alone, the removal of some editorial 
control over Internet access by the Federal Government would gain strict re-
view. In my view, it probably would, though it is not the clearest case. 
202. GERALD GUNTHER & KI\THLEEN SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
1318 (1997). 
203. See id. at 1319. 
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speech conducted with public funds (which can be circum-
scribed) and that conducted with private funds; but (2) if 
"segregation" is not feasible, the government may not 
"leverage" its contribution requirements to effectively encom-
pass private funds; and (3) it may not subsidize selectively on 
account ofviewpoint discrimination. 
Thus , if one assumes that the right of editorial selection is 
burdened by the imposition of filtering technologies, then a 
subsidy with strings is likely to be upheld unless the govern-
ment attempts to leverage a relatively small grant into a 
broader regulatory power.204 The "leverage" case would arise 
under facts substantially similar to FCC v. League of Women 
Voters, for example, if Congress required that all schools and 
libraries receiving federal funds install and use filtering soft-
ware on the computers that were connected to the net, even 
though the government grant was merely providing for the In-
ternet connection, and private funds had purchased the com-
puters. Assuming the right/burden scenario described above 
would be accepted by the Court, a "leveraged" requirement to 
filter is likely to be constitutional only if the funds with condi-
tions attached could be separated from other funds; if the gov-
ernment funds purchased computers, then the software could 
be installed on them.2os Under the current unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine, it is unlikely that the "grant" of universal 
service assistance (low or no cost telecommunications services) 
would be allowed to result in the imposition of filtering tech-
nologies on computers purchased (or donated) with other 
funds.206 
204. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984). 
205. See Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983). 
206. An alternative approach that the Court might take would be in view 
of the prohibition on selective subsidization on the basis of viewpoint dis-
crimination. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 
515 U.S. 819, 831-837 (1995) (striking down a public university's refusal to 
support fmancially a religious student group on the basis of viewpoint dis-
crimination). Assuming in this case that the Federal Government enforced 
filtering of sexual material, the "viewpoint" that would be discriminated 
against would probably be "sexuality," which is not among the range of view-
points that ordinarily leaps to mind when considering viewpoint discrimina-
tion. But it's no more odd than the Court's invocation of "religion" as a view-
point in Rosenberger. 
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2. Utilizing Procurement Power 
Unconstitutional conditions might also be raised if the 
government used its procurement power to influence the mar-
ket for Internet software in an attempt to bring about wide-
spread filtering. In broad strokes, a challenger would argue 
that the government violates the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine when it uses its market power to so alter the terrain 
upon which other speakers make choices as to effectively con-
strain those choices. Here I am thinking of two primary exam-
ples, although there are probably several others. The first is 
what I will call "opt-out influencing'': the Federal Government 
might purchase only web browser software that contained cer-
tain levels of filtering and blocking.207 Assuming that the gov-
ernment had enough purchasing power,2os this policy might in-
fluence browser manufacturers to standardize on this opt-out 
state, resulting in much broader use of filtering and blocking, 
and thus greatly incenting speaker-producers to rate their 
pages or be effectively invisible to a large portion of users. I 
call the second example "hyperlink influencing": the Federal 
Government could refuse to provide or allow hyperlinks from 
any of its web pages to those pages that were not rated by a 
particular PICS-enabled rating system. I will consider the is-
sues raised by each of these examples in turn. 
a. Influencing the Code: Opt-Out Browser Software 
The obstacles to challenging this form of government in-
fluence are formidable. The first is identifying a suitably-
burdened right. While the "benefit" is relatively easy to iden-
tify-the purchase of software in the first instance or the es-
tablishment209 or allowance210 of hyper links in the second-one 
must still decide whether the "right" that is being burdened is 
207. It could also more simply require that any filtering and blocking op-
tions be turned "on" by default, a less extreme case that nonetheless might 
have similar market-influencing effects. 
208. This is probably a stretch, but I would argue not wholly implausible. 
If the browser manufacturers were otherwise near indifference regarding the 
filtering and blocking features (say because of some significant consumer de-
mand), then the addition of even some governmental purchasing influence 
might make a difference. 
209. For a speaker-producer, hyperlinks from other pages are among the 
most valuable assets. Indeed, the provision of hyperlinks (usually via adver-
tisements) is a foundation of the current commercialization of cyberspace. 
210. See, e.g., Link Law on the Internet: A Panel Discussion, 38 IDEA 197 
(1998). 
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one that would, if burdened directly, be subject to strict judicial 
scrutiny. In the "opt-out influencing" example, there are a few 
"rights" that might arguably be burdened.21 1 The first is the 
right of the software producer to produce software with what-
ever parameters it chooses-this First Amendment right of 
software writing has been asserted in some contexts, although 
it is not widely recognized.212 The second right that might be 
burdened is the right of the end user to effectively choose not to 
block certain content-either because of the difficulties in 
changing the default opt-out settings in the software or be-
cause the software is hard-wired for opt-out and cannot be 
changed. This argument would rest upon the well-recognized 
First Amendment right to receive information.2l3 A third right 
that might be burdened is the right to be free from compelled 
speech as asserted by the speaker-producers whose choices of 
whether to rate are constrained by the increased use of filter-
ing and blocking caused by the predominance of software with 
an opt-out state. Although the right against compelled speech 
is well-recognized, whether the "compulsion" of rating one's 
web pages rises to the constitutional level (or fails to) will de-
pend in large part upon whether the arguments in Part 
IV(A)(l) above are accepted. 
A second major issue raised by the "opt-out influencing'' 
example is the relationship between unconstitutional condi-
tions and privity. Unconstitutional conditions doctrine com-
monly assumes a bargained-for exchange: a benefit granted in 
exchange for the curtailment of a right.214 In some cases, the 
211. I ignore here the claims of federal employees, who may themselves 
have a claim under a right-to-receive information theory. See United States v. 
National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 470 (1995) (noting the 
public's right to receive information); Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 
(1982) (describing the importance of the right tu receive ideas). Obviously, 
this claim is not unique to this context. 
212. For example, those challenging the Federal Government's restrictions 
on the export of encryption technology rely heavily upon the claim that com-
puter software is speech. See Bernstein v. Department of State, 922 F. Supp. 
1426, 1436 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (holding that cryptographic source code is speech). 
See generally R. Polk Wagner, The Medium Is the Mistake: The Law of Soft-
ware for the First Amendment, 51 STAN. L. REV. 387 (1999). 
213. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 867 (quoting Madison to emphasize the right's 
importance). For an excellent treatment of the right to receive information in 
the cyberspace context, see Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A 
Closer Look at 'Copyright Management' in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981 
(1996). 
214. See Epstein, supra note 192, at 7. 
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curtailment of the right will be so constitut ionally suspect as to 
make the "bargain" itself unconstitutional.215 But does the con-
tractual analogy extend to a requirement of privity? That is, 
does the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions require at least 
a nominal bargaining relationship-privity-between the gov-
ernment and the recipient of the benefit? 'This issue is 
squarely raised by the opt-out influencing example described 
above: the rights of the end user to receive information and the 
speaker-producer to "not rate" were not burdened through any 
deal they cut with the government. To the extent that they are 
burdened, they are only burdened by the choices made by the 
software producer and the operation of the market. If privity is 
required to make an unconstitutional conditions claim-and I 
can find no case that suggests that it is not-then perhaps the 
doctrine doesn't quite fit these circumstances.2J6 
b. Burdening the Hyperlink: Conditioning 'Access' to 
Government Pages 
The hyperlink influencing case offers the chance to ad-
dress more directly the unconstitutional conditions issue. 
Here, the burdened right is also the right against compelled 
speech, and privity is easily established: the government bene-
fit is the hyperlink, either given or allowed, and the condition 
is that the speaker-producer rate her speech. I believe that 
this issue will turn largely on two questions: first , does the 
right to "not rate" rise to the level of that necessary to trigger 
the application of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine; and 
second, is the refusal to allow or provide hyperlinks a nonsub-
sidy of speech or a penalty for exercising the right to "not rate"? 
In light of the discussion in Part IV(B)(2) above, we need 
not linger long on the first question, except to note that "the 
constitutional interest at issue must rise to the level of a rec-
ognized right-indeed, a preferred right normally protected by 
215. See id. at 8. 
216. This is obviously an area for further exploration. Without the appli-
cation of unconstitutional conditions, I see no other avenue for the end users 
and speaker-producers to challenge the restraints on their expression-the 
public-private distinction is even stronger in this context (where the govern-
ment is acting in its capacity as a purchaser rather than regulator) than in 
the compelled speech context noted above. Again, because the architecturalist 
view does not recognize the significance of the public-private distinction, it 
seems of no more help here than in the prior examples. See supra notes 165-
66 and accompanying text. 
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strict judicial review."217 Otherwise, the governmen t could ac-
complish the end directly, without having to resor t to indirect 
means . Therefore , if my conclusion that a compelled speech 
claim would not invalidate a government-imposed labeling re-
quirement is correct, then the unconstitutional conditions 
claim is unsound as well. 
The second question is, I believe, also easily disposed of. 
Given the apparent broad latitude that the Court has given the 
government in the subsidized speech context,218 I believe that 
the refusal of hyperlinking is unlikely to be seen as significant 
enough to be characterized as a penalty. Given the huge num-
bers of web pages available, restrictions on linking to (or from) 
would seem a relatively slight burden. Indeed, following the 
logic of Taxation With Representation ,219 the speaker-producer 
desiring the government "subsidy" (the link) would simply 
have to restructure its web site: perhaps by creating a rated 
"intermediate" page that would be segregated from the re-
mainder of the unrated content, or by linking to or from the 
government site via an intermediary web site .no Given the low 
cost of such restructuring, courts would likely find that the 
government condition was permissible, even if the right to "not 
rate" is recognized as one of heightened constitutional signifi-
cance. 
3. Influencing via Taxation 
Finally, conditioning tax exemptions for Internet speaker-
producers on the labeling or rating of the speaker-producer's 
speech would raise a plausible unconstitutional conditions 
question. The Court has determined that Congress may not 
grant tax exemptions that discriminate among speakers on the 
basis of content221 but that it may require that a recipient seg-
regate activities as a condition of receipt of a government bene-
fit.222 Here, the right-to "not rate"-and the benefit-a gov-
ernment (tax) subsidy-are the same as the right and benefit 
discussed immediately above. Most pertinently, the 
217. Sullivan, supra note 192, at 1427. 
218. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
219. Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983). 
220. See id. at 547-50. 
221. See Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 229-32 
(1987). 
222. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 197; Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. at 
544. 
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"restructuring" argument from the hyperlinking context is per-
haps available here; indeed, this case looks even more like 
Taxation Vlith Representation. This does provide an opportu-
nity to explore the argu.ment for unconstitutionality not noted 
above, although it may also apply in that context, that the re-
fusal to grant the condition is impermissibly content-based.223 
Because the government is basing the condition on whether the 
speaker-producer has labeled her speech, i.e., whether the la-
bel is present, the scheme might be said to be explicitly con-
tent-based. Viewed this way, the tax subsidy224 treats speaker-
producers that do attach labels to their pages differently from 
those that do not. The criticism of this point, however, is that 
the labeling requirement is not really content-based-it is 
wholly neutral regarding the underlying content of the speech, 
it just discriminates according to whether an invisible label is 
attached, and is indifferent even to the content of that label. 
This argument is essentially the same one discussed above in 
Part IV(A)(l)(b). And, as I argued there, the slight burden that 
the labeling requirement imposes will ultimately lead the 
Court to decide that such restrictions are content-neutral 
rather than content-based. 
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, because it ad-
dresses the sort of indirect market-influencing activity that 
Congress may well consider in the Internet regulation context, 
is a useful field for further exploration of these issues. Signifi-
cantly, however, it does not seem at this time to be able to ad-
dress the broader range of possible market-based influences 
that may result from government activities. In particular, the 
theories of privity and market coercion raise difficult questions 
for the application of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine 
to these issues. 
C. IN THE SHADOW OF REGULATION: ACTS, NON-ACTS, AND 
STATE ACTION 
It is generally believed that some form of overt government 
action is needed to raise constitutional issues-government 
advocacy, suggestions, and perhaps even threats or bullying do 
223. See Arkansas Writers' Project, 481 U.S. at 233 (applying strict scru-
tiny to the selective application of a sales tax to magazines and holding the 
tax unconstitutional). 
224. Though it would seem to apply as well to the hyperlinking issue. 
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not typically raise such questions.ns Thus, the range of per-
missible government activities that involve what might be 
called the shadow of regulation are quite broad and may be in-
creasingly likely avenues that the Feder al Government will 
pursue in its attempt to regulate Internet content.226 The in-
ter esting question in this context is where the "shadow" ends. 
That is, where is the "line" that the government cannot cross 
·without enabling Constitutional claims against itself. 
Several commentators have suggested that the current is-
sues regarding PICS and Internet content filters bear some re-
semblance to the :'V-Chip" intended to enable future content 
regulation of broadcast and cable television.227 In the V-Chip 
context, the government has already acted: provisions in the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 will soon require all television 
sets sold in the United States to contain the means to filter and 
block programming.22s It is not my purpose to explore the con-
stitutionality of the V-Chip rating and filtering system here. 
Rather, I want to point out that the rating system that is (or 
indeed, has been) voluntarily in troduced by the broadcasters 
may raise similar state action issues to the Internet filtering 
context. 
Section 551 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 out-
lines a publicly-supported but privately-implemented system 
for rating the content of television shows. The Act requires 
that distributors of such programming establish and imple-
ment "voluntary rules" for rating content and broadcast such 
ratings with the shows229_ a system that eventually developed 
and has been implemented. If such a system had not devel-
oped, the FCC was authorized to form an advisory committee 
to issue guidelines and recommend procedures, as well as to 
promulgate rules requiring the transmission of ratings if they 
existed.230 For our purposes, an interesting question is 
whether such a scheme constitutes state action. The ready an-
swer, of course, is that it unquestionably does: the government 
225. See, e.g., Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991); 
TRIBE, supra note 81, § 12-4; LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 
246-48 (1985) [hereinafter TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES] . 
226. See, e.g., President's Remarks, supra note 2. 
227. See Lessig, supra note 8, at 642; Matthew L. Spitzer, An Introduction 
to the Law and Economics of the V-Chip, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 429, 
433 n.12 (1997). 
228. Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 551(c), 110 Stat. 56, 141 (1996). 
229. See id. § 551(e). 
230. See id. § 551(b). 
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actually :requires the V-Ghip, for example. But what claims 
arise from the state action? In order for a speaker-producer to 
bring a cognizable First A._mendrnent claim, she will have to 
show ho-w a state action directly--or, perhaps in the case of un-
constitutional condition s, indirectly-burdened her rights to 
free expression. 
In this sense it is important to note the distinct-but-related 
nature of the state action and unconstitutional conditions doc-
trj.ne . The state action requirement tells us where the "zones" 
of private and public behavior meet and, ideally at least, tells 
us where the line is drawn.231 The unconstitutional conditions 
doct rine appears t o in large measure take up where the state 
action doctrine leaves off: addressing situations where the gov-
ernment is plainly acting but pe1·haps is attempting to do 
something indirectly that it may not do directly.232 The two 
may not quite meet in the middle-for example, I cannot think 
of how to overcome the lack of state action with respect to the 
end user in the opt-out influencing hypothetical described 
above, yet the apparent requirement for privity makes the un-
constitutional conditions doctrine also inapplicable.233 What 
doctrine will apply (if any) will depend upon the nature and di-
rection of the claim; carefully analyzing the difference between 
the two theories will st rengthen the underlying determination. 
For example , if the broadcastei" of a television show wishes 
to bring a "right not to rate" claim under the current self-
labeling scheme, she is unlikely to successfully argue that the 
labeling "requirement" itself is state action.234 A more fruitful 
231. See TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES, supra note 225, at 246. 
232. See Sullivan, supra note 192, at 1415. 
233. See supra note 214-216 and accompanying text. 
234. On this conclusion I differ with the analysis conducted by Professor 
Spitzer. He notes four reasons that he believes state action is present in the 
V-Chip case: (1) Congressional suggestions that the governmental grant of 
digital bandwidth be tied to a system of content rating; (2) requiring the V-
Chip in the television set itself; (3) governmental threats, advocacy, and re-
view of the system; and (4) the requirement that ratings be transmitted if 
they exist. See Spitzer, supra note 227, at 433-51. 
Factors (1), (2), and (4), however, seem more appropriately analyzed un-
der the unconstitutional conditions doctrine than under state action. In these 
three cases, state action unquestionably exists (I'm assuming that (1) was ac-
tually legislated-it is simply irrelevant if it was not); the task now is to show 
how the state action impermissibly forces the distributor to label her show. 
For example, if the Congress conditioned the grant of additional spectrum on 
the imposition of ratings, then the question is not simply whether the gov-
ernment acted to burden a right, but whether this constitutes an impermissi-
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avenue of pursuit might be to claim that the labeling r equire-
ment was a result of an unconstitutional conditions bargain-
Professor Spitzer notes that the Feder al Government was con-
sidering using the allocation of new digital spectrum as a 
"carrot" to force content rating. By focusing on the state action 
that is present, i.e., the labeling requirement, rather than 
downplaying the specific action required to label, a challenger 
may be able to bring the claim more successfully. 
CONCLUSION 
The relationship between filters and the First Amendment 
might be said to be an uneasy one. The rapidly-changing tech-
nology and its relationship to the law puts not insignificant 
pressure on current doctrinal concepts; traversing this path is 
difficult, and analytical obstacles abound. Yet the journey is 
wor th the effort-a solid footing on technological and doctrinal 
foundations will provide the best support for future develop-
ment in this area. 
The direct approach to the technology and doctrine fol -
lowed in this essay yields the con clusion that most of the gov-
ernment's indirect attempts to establish or support a P IGS-
enabled filtering regime would be constitutional. This conclu-
sion offers cautions to friends and foes of increased governmen-
tal regulation alike, however. A common thread running 
ble burden on First Amendment rights-an impermissible bargain. Similarly, 
requiring the V-Chip in TV sets is itself a clear governmental act-the ques-
tion is whether the act conditions access to those television sets upon the use 
of a ratings system. A very analogous analysis would exist for factor (4). The 
question of the relationship between an existing government act and a bur-
dened right is one for unconstitutional conditions rather than state action. 
Factor (3), however, raises questions of state action, but appears to fall 
far short of the level of "action" required: the "entanglement" principle that 
Spitzer relies upon in his analysis, see id. at 439, is more properly viewed 
through what Professor Tribe calls the "close-up lens" form of analysis. 
TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES, supra note 225, at 248. This lens looks at 
the nexus between a state activity and the person or entity who might be 
blamed. See id. It is not a theory of coercion. Cf Spitzer, supra note 227, at 
442 ("[T)he drafting of both the present ratings and brawnier new system was 
as voluntary as facing a firing squad.") (quoting Howard Rosenberg, Holdout 
by NBC to Provide Real Test, L.A. TIMES, July 30, 1997, at Fl). The nexus to 
an actual state regulation is a necessary element of the "close-up lens" analy-
sis. See TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES, supra note 225, at 250. Reducing 
state action to "pressure from President Clinton, threats from congressmen," 
see Spitzer, supra note 227, at 444, or even the non-binding recommendations 
of the FCC would go a long way toward making the requirement for state ac-
tion meaningless. 
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thTough the analyses is the importance of the public-private 
distinction. And, while the distinction may in some cases aid 
the government in indirectly supporting private regulation of 
content, an important basis of that conclusion is the continued 
existence of robust choices for the end user and speaker-
producer. 
F inally, the conclusion that many of the government's ac-
tivities with respect to filters and the First Amendment only 
highlight the importance of the political and legislative proc-
esses in resolving these issues. Although the architecture of 
PICS allows myriad private choices to influence the state of the 
Internet, there is still a significant role for the government-
especially the legislative and executive branches-in helping to 
shaue the architecture itself. Those who believe that PICS and ... 
other filtering technologies are going to be ultimately detri-
mental to expression are well advised to focus their efforts on 
creating a politics of filters as well as a new constitutional doc-
trine; it may be that the expansive protection from even private 
content regulation that they seek will be found in the Congress 
rather than the courts. 
